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-mail has changed the landscape of communication at work and 
beyond.  Employees frequently use their workplace e-mail for 
personal messages.  In most instances, employers look the other way 
at this diversion of resources unless either productivity is 
compromised or the employees circulate subject matter, such as 
offensive jokes, that could subject the employer to liability for 
maintaining a hostile work environment.  Employers often have a 
different reaction, however, when they detect activity that they think 
might undercut their authority or indicate outside intervention by a 
union.  In those situations, employers might clamp down on the use of 
company property or work time for communicating what management 
perceives as unsettling or disloyal messages.  This reaction by 
management might occur whether the message is orally 
communicated, posted on a bulletin board, made by telephone, sent 
by the U.S. Postal Service or a private carrier service, or transmitted 
by e-mail. 
The Guard Publishing Co. decision (hereinafter referred to as 
Register-Guard I) raised the questions of whether an employer’s 
prohibition on the use of its e-mail for all “nonjob-related [sic] 
solicitations” may include union-related e-mails and whether such a 
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policy violates federal labor law.1  A related issue is whether an 
employer is free to enforce such a policy against union-related e-mails 
while simultaneously permitting employees to send non-business-
related personal e-mails.  In Register-Guard I, a divided National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) upheld just such an e-
mail policy, as well as the disciplinary enforcement of that policy, 
against allegations that the policy violated the National Labor 
Relations Act2 (NLRA or the Act).3 
Register-Guard I represented an important decision for the NLRB 
because of the issues presented with respect to the medium of 
workplace e-mail, and the case afforded the agency an opportunity to 
illustrate its continuing relevance in the twenty-first century.  At the 
Board level, the Register-Guard I decision was heralded as a “blow to 
organized labor” that “could have a broad impact, because unions 
often use company e-mail to update workers about contract 
negotiations or plans for work stoppages, and also [e-mail] is widely 
used in organizing campaigns.”4  Former Board Member John 
Raudabaugh  argued in an amicus brief that “federal labor law doesn’t 
 
1 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
2 Id.  Then-Chairman of the NLRB Robert Battista was joined by Members Schaumber 
and Kirsanow in the majority opinion.  Members Liebman and Walsh dissented to the 
Board majority’s holding that the employer’s ban on using e-mail for non-job-related 
solicitations was lawful and to the majority’s “overruling of bedrock Board precedent 
about the meaning of discrimination as applied to Section 8(a)(1).”  Id. at 1121; see also 
Susan J. McGolrick, Unfair Labor Practices: NLRB 3-2 Allows Publisher’s E-mail Policy 
Prohibiting ‘Non-Job-Related Solicitations,’ Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 246, at A-1 
(Dec. 24, 2007) [hereinafter McGolrick, NLRB 3-2] (discussing the Board’s decision).  
The current Board is composed of just two members, Chairman Liebman and now-
Member Schaumber.  National Labor Relations Board, Board Member Biographies, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/About_Us/Overview/Board/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).  President 
Barack Obama recently designated Wilma Liebman Chairman of the Board.  See Susan J. 
McGolrick, NLRB: Obama Designates Liebman as Chairman, Rewarding Her 11 Years of 
Service on Board, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 13, at A-8 (Jan. 23, 2009) (discussing the 
announcement regarding Chairman Liebman, the current composition of the Board, and 
the likelihood of a Democratic majority as three vacancies are filled).  The Register-Guard 
I case was recently deemed to be one of six significant Board rulings awaiting court 
review by the two current Board members.  See Susan J. McGolrick, Obama Has 
Opportunity to Quickly Create Democratic Majority on Board, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), 
No. 15, at S-9 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
3 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 150–169 (2006). 
4 Kris Maher, Union Use of Company Email Is Limited, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2007, at 
A7.  The Board member opinions divided along political party lines: members of the 
majority voting to limit union use of company e-mail were Republican appointees, and the 
dissenters, who argued that employers should not be able to ban non-job-related e-mail 
activity, including union communications, were Democratic appointees. 
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guarantee employees or unions access to company email” and 
highlighted the importance of the decision since “[t]his case applies to 
every employer in the United States.”5  In fact, the importance of the 
subject matter led the NLRB to schedule a rare oral argument and 
solicit comments on a list of published questions surrounding the 
issues in the case.6 
Register-Guard I is likely to result in increased employer 
monitoring of employee e-mail as the majority opinion made clear 
that employers have property rights in their e-mail systems and, thus, 
have the right to limit employees’ use of workplace e-mail regarding 
unions and organizational topics.7  Employers may legally prohibit 
union activity on e-mail if they similarly ban solicitations by other 
outside organizations, even though they may still permit “office 
chitchat and personal messages.”8 
Register-Guard I was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, and some critics of the Board’s decision speculated that 
the appellate court would ask the Board to modify its ruling because it 
is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.9  The outcome of the 
appeal, discussed in the Addendum at the end of this Article, as well 
as changes in the NLRB’s membership could well result in the 
adoption of a different standard for workplace communication 
policies and their enforcement in the near future.10  A memorandum 
from the NLRB General Counsel reported on five cases since 
Register-Guard I that provide guidance on the Board’s Register-
 
5 Id.  The decision applies to all private-sector employers who are covered by the 
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act regardless of whether the employees are 
unionized or not. 
6 See infra notes 45–67 and accompanying text (discussing notice of oral argument, 
questions for consideration, and positions reflected in briefs of amici). 
7 Morey Stettner, More Firms Will Eye Blogs, E-mail in ‘08; Employers Expanding 
Programs to Monitor What Workers Do Online, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 31, 2007, 
at AO7 (noting that the NLRB’s decision signals that employers own computers and 
employees lack legal right to use them for certain communications). 
8 Tim Fought, Board: Companies Can Bar Union E-Mail, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 22, 
2007, available at http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2007/12/22/1181742-board-com 
panies-can-bar-union-email. 
9 Lawrence E. Dube, NLRA: Law Professors Speaking at ABA Conference Criticize 
NLRB’s Register-Guard Decision, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 87, at C-1 (May 6, 2008) 
(citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)).  In fact, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals did reverse the Board’s decision and remand in relevant part.  Guard 
Publ’g Co. v. NLRB (Register-Guard II), 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see infra notes 
349–63 and accompanying text (discussing appellate court decision). 
10 See infra notes 349–63 and accompanying text. 
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Guard I decision and its practical implications.11  Due to the 
importance of the issues involved in these cases, the General Counsel 
directed all regional offices to submit discrimination cases that 
implicate the Board’s decision in Register-Guard I to the Division of 
Advice,12 which provides legal advice to the NLRB regional offices.13  
The procedure of deferral to the Division of Advice ensures that the 
regional offices treat significant and recently litigated issues 
appropriately and consistently.14 
This Article explores the issues relating to policies that cover use 
of company equipment and systems, especially restrictions on e-mail, 
and how these policies may be legally problematic if they interfere 
with the National Labor Relations Act, which governs the right, 
among others, to engage in union activities.  This Article focuses 
upon the significance of the NLRB’s Register-Guard I decision, the 
legal basis and sources cited by the majority in support of its decision, 
the arguments of the dissenting members, and the General Counsel’s 
recent applications of the majority’s discrimination standard in 
Register-Guard I.  Why the Board’s decision in Register-Guard I was 
appealed and restricted is discussed, taking into account precedent 
under the NLRA and the current status and uses of e-mail.15  This 
 
11 Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, NLRB General Counsel, to NLRB Division 
Heads, Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (May 15, 2008) 
[hereinafter GC Memorandum], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC 
%20Memo/2008/GC%2008-07%20Report%20on%20Case%20Development.pdf; see also 
NLRB: General Counsel Meisburg Issues Report Discussing Recent E-mail, Solicitation 
Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 97, at A-1 (May 20, 2008) (discussing the GC 
Memorandum). 
12 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3. 
13 See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2660 (John E. Higgins, Jr., ed., 5th ed. 2006). 
14 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3, 12 (directing regional offices to send these 
cases to the NLRB Division of Advice in order to maintain a consistent approach to the 
interpretation of the decision and case-handling).  In fact, the General Counsel had 
previously listed “[c]ases involving claims that rules that prohibit or limit non-business use 
of employer supplied e-mail, access to the Internet, cell phones, digital assistants, or other 
employer-owned means of electronic communication unlawfully interfere with the Section 
7 protected [sic] activities” as actions that must be submitted to the Division of Advice.  
Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, NLRB General Counsel, to NLRB Regional 
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 3 (Sept. 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2007/GC%2007-11%20Mandatory%20 
Submission%20to%20Advice.pdf. 
15 See Dube, supra note 9, at C-3.  Subsequently, the Guard Publishing Company itself 
asked the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to review the Board’s decision, and the union 
thereafter petitioned for review.  See id. at C-1; see also Christine Neylon O’Brien, The 
Impact of Employer E-mail Policies on Employee Rights to Engage in Concerted Activities 
Protected by the National Labor Relations Act, 106 DICK. L. REV. 573, 588–89 (2002) 
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Article questions the legality of workplace communication systems 
policies that permit nonbusiness uses of communications systems yet 
also prohibit concerted activity and union-related communications 
among employees.  The distinctions appear to be based upon 
disfavored content, involving protected concerted activity, rather than 
legally relevant distinctions that pertain to legitimate business 
reasons.  The Article concludes that the NLRB needs to modernize its 
rules to embrace the realities of electronic communication and 
suggests a standard for balancing employees’ NLRA rights with 
employers’ legitimate business reasons relating to production, 
discipline, or other modern-day equivalents. 
I 
THE RELEVANT FACTS, ISSUES, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN 
REGISTER-GUARD I 
The Guard Publishing Company publishes the Register-Guard, a 
daily newspaper, in Eugene, Oregon.16  The company implemented a 
Communications Systems Policy (CSP) in 1996, shortly after the 
installation of a new computer system.17  The CSP explicitly noted 
that the computer equipment and system were owned and provided by 
the company to assist in conducting business.18  The CSP contained 
the following prohibition: “Communications systems are not to be 
used to solicit or proselytize for commercial ventures, religious or 
political causes, outside organizations, or other non-job-related 
solicitations.”19 
A local union represented about 150 Register-Guard employees as 
part of its bargaining unit.20  Suzi Prozanski was the president of the 
local union and also worked as a copy editor.21  She sent three union-
related e-mails on the company’s e-mail system.22  Her first e-mail 
involved an attempt to clarify inaccurate statements made by another 
 
(discussing the interaction between employer e-mail policies and section 7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act). 
16 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1133 (2007). 
17 Id. at 1111. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 1133. 
21 Id. at 1133–34. 
22 Steven Greenhouse, Ruling Lets Firms Bar Union E-mail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2007, at A28, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/business/22cnd-labor 
.html. 
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employee, Bill Bishop, regarding a union rally.23  Ms. Prozanski first 
told her managing editor that she intended to send the e-mail, and he 
asked her to wait until he checked with Human Resources.  Two days 
later, when Ms. Prozanski had not heard back from her editor, she 
told him that she was going to send the e-mail, and he simply replied, 
“I understand.”24  Ms. Prozanski wrote the e-mail, with the subject 
line “setting it straight,” while she was on break from her 
workstation.25  The next day, she received a written warning for 
violating company policy by using company e-mail to conduct union 
business.26 
Three months after the first e-mail, Ms. Prozanski sent two e-mails 
to multiple Register-Guard e-mail addresses from the union’s 
office—not from company premises.27  These e-mails sought support 
for the union’s negotiating position by asking employees to wear 
green and to participate in the union’s float in the town parade.  Ms. 
Prozanski testified that she thought sending the e-mails from the 
union office obviated any problems with the company’s computer 
policy because she was not using company equipment.28  
Nonetheless, Ms. Prozanski received another written warning for 
using the company’s communication system for union activities, in 
violation of the prohibition on “non-job-related solicitations.”29 
The union filed several unfair labor practice charges with the 
NLRB alleging the Register-Guard discriminatorily enforced its CSP 
with respect to union material.30  Under NLRA section 7,  
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
 
23 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1111.  Mr. Bishop also received a written warning 
for his violation of the CSP, but the unfair labor practice complaint did not allege that 
Bishop’s discipline was unlawful.  Id. at 1111 n.5. 
24 Id. at 1111. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  Another unfair labor practice issue arose regarding the company’s collective 
bargaining proposal that the electronic communications systems were not to be used for 
union business, but ultimately this was disposed of by the Board.  Id. at 1110, 1112. 
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mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain 
from any or all such activities.31 
This language, including the “concerted activities” terminology, has 
been interpreted to provide protection for employees who band 
together to discuss wages, hours, and working conditions and 
employees who engage in discussions regarding “mutual aid or 
protection,” even in the absence of a union agent.32  Some e-mail 
discussions have been included within the protection of section 7 even 
in the absence of a union.33 
Where employers interfere with section 7 rights, numerous unfair 
labor practices may be asserted under section 8 of the Act.34  Section 
8(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 
“to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed” under section 7.35  Section 8(a)(3) prohibits 
employer “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or 
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization.”36 
In this case, the union alleged both that the Register-Guard 
violated NLRA sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) in its maintenance and 
enforcement of an overbroad no-solicitation policy and that the 
Register-Guard discriminatorily enforced its policy against Ms. 
Prozanski because her e-mail regarded union matters.37  The CSP 
explicitly prohibited employees from using e-mail to solicit, and the 
union argued that Ms. Prozanski’s e-mail was not a solicitation.38 
Whether employee conduct amounts to solicitation or not is 
important in determining whether a workplace communications 
policy that prohibits solicitation has been violated.  Whether a 
solicitation is job-related is equally critical under policies similar to 
those at the Register-Guard.  Solicitation in general is defined as 
“[t]he act or an instance of requesting or seeking to obtain something; 
 
31 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006). 
32 See DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 136 (12th ed. 2003) (noting 
union designation is not required and individuals may act in concert when furthering goals 
of a group of employees). 
33 See Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997). 
34 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006). 
35 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). 
36 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006). 
37 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007). 
38 Id. at 1133. 
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a request or petition.”39  Further, it is important under section 7 to 
categorize employee communications as either a solicitation or a 
distribution.  While a solicitation seeks a response, a distribution 
seeks to convey material to another without soliciting a reply.  In the 
context of union organization or employee engagement in concerted 
activities, employers have the right to establish rules to maintain 
discipline in their establishments and, through that right, employers 
may prohibit union solicitation during working time.40  If printed 
materials are distributed, employers may limit such distribution to 
nonwork time and nonwork areas.41  These statutory sections and 
Board and judicial precedents provide a preliminary context for 
analyzing the Board’s and the appellate court’s decisions in this case. 
A.  The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision 
In 2002, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John J. McCarrick held, 
inter alia, that the Register-Guard violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of 
the Act through its discriminatory enforcement of its CSP.42  While 
the ALJ found that the employer could maintain the CSP, the 
company violated the Act by “enforcing the CSP to prohibit union-
related e-mails while allowing a variety of other nonwork-related [sic] 
e-mails.”43  Thereafter, the employer, union, and the Board’s General 
Counsel filed various exceptions, cross-exceptions, and supporting, 
reply, and answering briefs.44 
B.  The National Labor Relations Board: Call for Comment from 
Parties and Amici and Notice of Oral Argument 
In January 2007, the Board issued a notice of oral argument along 
with an invitation for amicus curiae briefs.45  The Board spelled out 
questions for the parties and prospective amici to address, including 
“whether employees have a Section 7 right to use their employer’s e-
mail system to communicate with one another, what standard should 
govern that determination, and whether an employer violates the Act 
 
39 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (8th ed. 2004). 
40 Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (regarding solicitation). 
41 Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962) (regarding distribution of union 
literature). 
42 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1112. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1110 n.1. 
45 Id. at 1110. 
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if it permits other nonwork-related [sic] e-mails but prohibits e-mails 
on Section 7 matters.”46 
The Board’s General Counsel argued that rules limiting employee 
communication at work should be judged by balancing section 7 
rights against the employer’s interest in maintaining discipline.47  
While an employer has legitimate business interests in preventing 
liability for inappropriate content in e-mails, protecting its system 
against overloads and viruses, and preserving confidentiality and 
productivity, the General Counsel nonetheless proposed that “broad 
rules prohibiting nonbusiness use of e-mail should be presumptively 
 
46 Id.  The full list of questions published by the Board follows: 
1. Do employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system (or other 
computer-based communication systems) to communicate with other employees 
about union or other concerted, protected matters?  If so, what restrictions, if any, 
may an employer place on those communications?  If not, does an employer 
nevertheless violate the Act if it permits non-job-related e-mails but not those 
related to union or other concerted, protected matters? 
2. Should the Board apply traditional rules regarding solicitation and/or 
distribution to employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system?  If so, how 
should those rules be applied?  If not, what standard should be applied? 
3. If employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, may an 
employer nevertheless prohibit e-mail access to its employees by non-employees?  
If employees have a right to use their employer’s e-mail system, to what extent 
may an employer monitor that use to prevent unauthorized use? 
4. In answering the foregoing questions, of what relevance is the location of the 
employee’s workplace?  For example, should the Board take account of whether 
the employee works at home or at some location other than a facility maintained 
by the employer? 
5. Is employees’ use of their employer’s e-mail system a mandatory subject of 
bargaining?  Assuming that employees have a Section 7 right to use their 
employer’s e-mail system, to what extent is that right waivable [sic] by their 
bargaining representative? 
6. How common are employer policies regulating the use of employer e-mail 
systems?  What are the most common provisions of such policies?  Have any such 
policies been agreed to in collective bargaining?  If so, what are their most 
significant provisions and what, if any, problems have arisen under them? 
7. Are there any technological issues concerning e-mail or other computer-based 
communication systems that the Board should consider in answering the 
foregoing questions? 
Press Release, NLRB, NLRB to Hold Oral Argument on Employee Use of Employer’s E-
mail System (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press 
%20Releases/2006/R-2613.pdf. 
47 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1112 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 
324 U.S. 793 (1945)). 
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unlawful, absent a particularized showing of special circumstances.”48  
Less-broad prohibitions would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
The General Counsel reasoned that e-mail cannot be “neatly 
characterized as either ‘solicitation’ or ‘distribution.’”49  The General 
Counsel argued that e-mail is interactive; electronic communications 
permit thousands of transmissions at one time, unlike the telephone.50  
This basis was used for distinguishing Board decisions relating to 
employee use of telephones, bulletin boards, and other equipment 
from decisions relating to e-mail.51  Finally, the General Counsel 
asserted that allowing personal e-mails while prohibiting union-
related e-mails on the basis that these communications are “on behalf 
of an ‘outside organization’” violates section 8(a)(1) in that the 
employer’s policy interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees 
with respect to their section 7 rights.52 
The union argued both that the employees were allowed to use the 
employer’s e-mail system to communicate nonbusiness matters 
generally and that the employees were rightfully on the employer’s 
property while at work, and, thus, they were not trespassing.53  The 
union asserted that the employer’s management interests should be 
balanced against section 7 rights and that nondiscriminatory 
restrictions on e-mail may be imposed during working time, but 
additional restrictions should be imposed only where “necessary to 
further substantial management interests.”54 
The Register-Guard argued that employees have no section 7 right 
to use its e-mail system.55  The equipment and system are owned by 
the company for business purposes, and the company insisted that 
Board precedent allows employers to restrict nonbusiness use, 
including restrictions on union-related communications.56  The 
employer further argued that cases involving oral solicitation were 
“inapposite” because the company’s equipment is used for e-mail and 
noted that the employees and the union had other means of 
 
48 Id. at 1113. 
49 Id. at 1112. 
50 Id. at 1112–13. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1113. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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communicating besides e-mail.57  Basically, there is more of a burden 
on, or cost to, the company when employees use company equipment 
to communicate by e-mail as opposed to oral communication where 
no company equipment is utilized.  Finally, the company argued that 
the correct analysis regarding discrimination would be a comparison 
of their treatment of union solicitations and their treatment of other 
organizational material that promotes meetings or group action, 
“persuader literature,” or the sale of outside products through the use 
of the company’s communications system.58 
Amici in support of the General Counsel and the union included 
the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and the 
National Workrights Institute.59  The NELA argued both that e-mail 
communication is no different than communication in lunchrooms 
and break rooms and that proscribing e-mail during nonworking time 
would not be consonant with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Republic Aviation.60  Further, the NELA maintained that union-
related e-mails should be categorized as job-related rather than non-
job-related.61  The National Workrights Institute noted that e-mail is a 
“predominant” method of communication and that most employers 
permit some personal use.  The Institute expressed concern over the 
vagueness of employer e-mail policies and their application on an ad 
hoc basis because “uncertainty chills employee use of e-mail for 
Section 7 purposes.”62  Basically, a ban on union-related e-mail 
should be a violation of section 8(a)(1) because it interferes with 
protected activity under section 7.63 
Amici in support of the company included the HR Policy 
Association, the Minnesota Management Attorneys Association, the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Employers Group.64  They 
focused on the primacy of the employer’s property interest, arguing 
that an employer should be able “to impose nondiscriminatory 
restrictions on e-mail use.”65  The Employers Group and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce argued even when an employer allows 
 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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personal e-mail, it must impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory limits 
on size, attachments, and number of recipients.66  The amici 
supporting the company maintained that allowing some personal e-
mails while prohibiting solicitations on behalf of unions and other 
organizations does not violate the NLRA.67 
C.  The Board Adopts New Distinctions Regarding Discriminatory 
Enforcement While Upholding the Legality of Employer E-mail Policy 
that Prohibits Non-Job-Related and Outside Solicitations 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
a.  Employer Property Rights in its Communication Systems Prevail 
Over Employee Section 7 Rights 
The Board held that employees have no statutory right under 
section 7 of the Act to use the employer’s system for non-job-related 
solicitations.68  After an examination of Board precedent, the Board 
explicitly decided to modify its approach in cases of discriminatory 
enforcement of e-mail policies, holding that “discrimination under the 
Act means drawing a distinction along Section 7 lines,”69 which 
ordinarily means that similar types of activities are treated disparately  
based upon the presence of union content or conduct.  Thus, some 
outside organizations would be allowed to communicate, but similar 
union-related communications would be subjected to discipline.70  
The Board ruled that the newspaper publisher’s enforcement of its 
Communications Systems Policy against Ms. Prozanski for sending 
two e-mails urging other employees to support the union was lawful, 
 
66 Id. at 1114. 
67 Id.  While the amici in support of the company thought that e-mail did not “fit neatly” 
into the Board’s analytical framework for solicitation and distribution, the Employers 
Group and the HR Policy Association argued that, if the Board sought to analyze e-mail by 
either of these frameworks, it should be the framework of distribution.  Id. at 1113–14.  No 
doubt these employer-friendly amici sought to analogize e-mail to distribution rather than 
solicitation because the Board’s rule for distribution is more restrictive—generally 
allowing employers to prohibit distribution during working time and in working areas—
while the general rule for solicitation is that employers may prohibit such communication 
only during working time.  See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 107 (John E. Higgins, Jr., 
ed., 5th ed. 2006) (discussing the Board’s no-solicitation and no-distribution rules since 
Republic Aviation). 
68 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1110. 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at 1115 (comparing categories of permitted e-mails to those that resulted in 
discipline). 
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thus overturning the administrative law judge’s decision.71  The first 
e-mail that Ms. Prozanski sent, in which she sought to clarify the 
specifics of a union rally, was not deemed to be a “solicitation” by the 
majority because it did not solicit a reply or response, and, thus, the 
employer’s enforcement of its policy against her for sending that e-
mail, including the written warning, violated sections 8(a)(3) and (1) 
of the NLRA.72 
The Board majority in Register-Guard I held that the employer’s 
Communications Systems Policy, which prohibits use of the 
employer’s e-mail system for any non-job-related solicitations, did 
not conflict with any statutory rights under section 7 of the NLRA.73  
It noted that, while the issue of employees’ rights to use an employer 
e-mail system for section 7 purposes was one of first impression, 
related precedent existed on employee use of bulletin boards, 
telephones, and televisions for these purposes.74  The majority relied 
upon the employer’s right to regulate employee use of company 
property, noting that the Board found no statutory right for employees 
to use an employer’s equipment or media as long as the restrictions on 
that use are not discriminatory.75  As will be discussed later, the 
categorization of the employee activity and the analysis applied for 
determining whether a restriction on e-mail is discriminatory with 
respect to section 7 rights are both critical in setting the parameters 
for lawful employer e-mail policies. 
The NLRB majority found the dissenters’ reliance upon the 
analytical framework of Republic Aviation v. NLRB inapposite.76  In 
Republic Aviation, an employer maintained a broad no-solicitation 
rule on its premises and discharged an employee for soliciting union 
membership on his lunch break.77  In Republic Aviation, the Board 
“found that the rule and its enforcement violated Section 8(a)(1).”78  
 
71 Id. at 1110, 1113–14 (discussing the legality of the employer’s Communications 
Systems Policy in each instance); see also McGolrick, NLRB 3-2, supra note 2, at A-1. 
72 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114; McGolrick, NLRB 3-2, supra note 2, at A-1.  
Because the first e-mail sent by Ms. Prozanski did not fit within the prohibited category of 
“nonjob-related [sic] solicitations” in the company’s CSP, it was discriminatory for the 
Register-Guard to enforce the CSP and discipline her with a written warning for sending 
that e-mail. 
73 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1114. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1115 (referencing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision in Republic 
Aviation, finding that employer property rights must give way in 
some instances to safeguard section 7 rights where an employer rule 
would otherwise deprive employees of their right to communicate in 
the workplace on their own time.79  Absent “‘special circumstances 
mak[ing] the rule necessary in order to maintain production or 
discipline,’” a no-solicitation rule during nonwork time is “‘an 
unreasonable impediment to self-organization.’”80  The Register-
Guard I majority distinguished the instant case from Republic 
Aviation on the basis that the Register-Guard’s CSP, unlike the 
employer policy in Republic Aviation, did not regulate “face-to-face 
solicitation.”81  The majority in Register-Guard I focused on the 
employer’s property interest and did not characterize e-mail as either 
solicitation or distribution, and so the majority decision avoided the 
issue of whether e-mail was “more analogous to distribution than to 
solicitation.”82  The Board majority noted that section 7 does not 
require that employees have access to any “particular means” to 
communicate, nor are they “‘entitled to use a medium of 
communications simply because the Employer is using it.’”83  Nor 
does section 7 require an employer to provide the “most convenient or 
most effective means of conducting those communications.”84 
The Register-Guard I majority explicitly avoided reliance upon the 
Board’s decision in Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, Inc., 
a precedent cited by the administrative law judge.85  Adtranz involved 
a failure to establish nondiscriminatory enforcement of a business-
use-only rule regarding employee e-mail use.86  Rather than 
distinguish the limited Board cases and guidance available on 
employer e-mail policies, the Register-Guard I majority preferred to 
focus on the employer’s property rights in its communications 
systems, emphasizing that the “Board has never found that employees 
have a general right to use their employer’s telephone system for 
 
79 Id. (quoting Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 801–02). 
80 Id. (quoting Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 803 n.10). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 1115 n.9. 
83 Id. at 1115 (quoting NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357, 363–64 
(1958)). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1114 n.8 (citing Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, Inc., 331 
N.L.R.B. 291 (2000), vacated in part, 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
86 Id.; see also O’Brien, supra note 15, at 583–84 (discussing Adtranz). 
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Section 7 communications.”87  The work environment at the Register-
Guard did not eliminate face-to-face communication by any means, 
and, thus, the majority saw no reason, in the absence of 
discrimination, to mandate employee use of the employer’s e-mail 
system for section 7 purposes.88  The majority found that the CSP “on 
its face does not discriminate;” therefore, the policy did not violate 
section 8(a)(1).89 
b.  The Majority’s Test for Discriminatory Enforcement 
The Register-Guard I majority modified the Board’s previous 
analysis regarding whether employer actions amount to 
discrimination against section 7 activity.90  Citing two Board 
decisions that were not enforced by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, the Register-Guard I majority adopted that appellate 
court’s analysis of discrimination, namely that “discrimination means 
the unequal treatment of equals.”91  Pursuant to the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis in Fleming Co. and Guardian Industries Corp., the 
distinction between organizational notices and personal postings on 
bulletin boards was significant.92  The Seventh Circuit did not treat 
these notices as “equals” because they are not similar in character; 
therefore, the employer’s disparate treatment of each communication 
medium was not deemed to be discrimination along section 7 lines by 
the Register-Guard I majority.93  It would be a violation of the Act, in 
the majority’s view, if an employer allowed solicitation either by one 
union but not another or by anti-union employees but not pro-union 
employees because, in both situations, the two parties are similar in 
 
87 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1116.  Significantly, the majority cited no 
precedent in support of this broad statement. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.  The Board majority’s use of the language that “the CSP on its face does not 
discriminate” when affirming the legality of the employer’s maintenance of the CSP seems 
to indicate that the impact of maintaining the policy was not considered relevant to the 
inquiry of whether the CSP discriminated against section 7 activity.  See id. (emphasis 
added); see also infra notes 360–63 and accompanying text (discussing that the issue of 
the legality of the CSP itself was not appealed; therefore, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not consider this). 
90 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1116. 
91 Id. at 1117 (citing Fleming Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 192 (2001), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2003); Guardian Indus. Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1994), 
enforcement granted in part, enforcement denied in part, 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
92 Id. (citing Fleming Co. v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
93 See id. at 1117–18. 
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character, and thus, to have such a prohibition would be 
discrimination.94  An employer is not prohibited from “drawing lines 
on a non-Section 7 basis.”95  Thus, distinctions made between 
solicitations that are charitable and noncharitable, personal and 
commercial, business and nonbusiness, and organizational or not, 
would all survive scrutiny because the distinctions do not discriminate 
along section 7 lines, according to the Board majority.96 
The dissent argued that discrimination is not the essential analysis 
for a section 8(a)(1) violation; rather, this analysis merely speaks to 
the employer’s purported legitimate business reason for its conduct.97  
The Register-Guard I majority found that there was no evidence that 
the employer had an anti-union motive.98  Nonetheless, Member Peter 
Kirsanow, while joining the majority opinion, noted separately that 
where a “facially Section 7-neutral line” is drawn, in terms of 
determining whether there is an anti-union motive, an employer’s 
reasonable interest is relevant.99  Thus, if both the “effect” of the line 
drawn is that all section 7 communications are prohibited and the line 
“is not based on any reasonable employer interest[, then] an antiunion 
motive [is] a permissible inference.”100 
The majority dismissed the dissent’s argument that an employer’s 
disparate treatment of unlike groups amounts to discrimination.  The 
majority looked to the Supreme Court’s refusal to require like 
treatment of supervisors and employees in terms of each group’s 
ability to communicate organizational messages.101  In the majority’s 
view, it would be a different matter if the employer “truly diminished 
 
94 Id. at 1118 n.17 (citing NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357, 363–
64 (1958), for the proposition that employers may use their own equipment to send anti-
union messages while denying employees the use of equipment to send pro-union 
missives).  It would violate section 8(a)(2)’s prohibition on domination or assistance if an 
employer favored one union’s messages over another.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006). 
95 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1118. 
96 Id.; see infra notes 352–59 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals to accept the company’s post hoc justification for its discipline of 
Ms. Prozanski). 
97 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1118; see also infra notes 113–78 and 
accompanying text (discussing Register-Guard I dissent). 
98 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1118 n.18. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  Member Kirsanow clearly alluded to the relevance of the impact of a facially 
neutral line when deciding whether the line was drawn with an anti-union motive. 
101 Id. at 1118 (citing NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958)). 
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the ability of the labor organization . . . to carry its message to the 
employees.”102 
The Register-Guard I majority inferred that there must be actual 
discrimination on the basis of the rule or prohibition, indicating that 
the dissent “fail[ed] to acknowledge that many decisions require 
actual discrimination.”103  The majority, in adopting the rule from the 
Seventh Circuit, stated that “unlawful discrimination consists of 
disparate treatment of activities or communications of a similar 
character because of their union or other Section 7-protected 
status.”104  Two phrases are of particular significance: “disparate 
treatment” and “similar character.”  The language “disparate 
treatment” is critical because it contrasts with disparate impact.105  
The employer’s conduct, practice, or rule itself must be overtly 
discriminatory in order to constitute a violation under the disparate 
treatment standard; a disparate impact, however, can be found to be a 
violation if the conduct, practice, or rule is facially neutral yet has a 
disproportionate impact upon a protected group or activity.  The 
disparate treatment standard sets a low standard for scrutiny of 
employer rules that may limit or prevent employees from engaging in 
protected concerted activity. There is simply no reason or precedent 
for setting the bar this low.  The test adopted by the Register-Guard I 
majority permits employers to engage in conduct that is 
discriminatory in impact with respect to section 7 activities, as long as 
the discrimination is not overt, intentional, or motivated by anti-union 
animus. 
The second phrase of interest in the majority’s language relates to 
what activities or communications are of a “similar character.”  The 
key issue with this language is that delineating the appropriateness of 
categories is in the eye of the beholder, and the initial subjective 
determinations of appropriate categories in communications policies 
 
102 Id. 
103 Id. (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 1119. 
105 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding employer 
discriminated on basis of race as to transfers and hiring by using tests and educational 
requirements that both were not job-related and acted as barriers to hiring and 
advancement of minorities due to their disparate impact).  The Register-Guard I dissent 
referenced an article that took issue with the Guardian Industries court’s mistaken 
importation of  Title VII’s disparate treatment approach into section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  
Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1129 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, dissenting) 
(citing Rebecca Hanner White, Modern Discrimination Theory and the National Labor 
Relations Act, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 99, 115 (1997)). 
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are likely to be made by employers, who are not bound by legally 
relevant categories.  What activities or communications are of a 
“similar character” is far from clear even after taking into account 
decisions of courts faced with enforcing or denying enforcement of 
Board orders regarding analogous matters.  A preferable standard 
would require legal categories outlined by the Board that relate to 
statutory parameters and legislative intent.  The test of the legality of 
any workplace communications systems policy should require a 
balancing of an employer’s legitimate business reasons—for its 
announced categories of permitted and prohibited activities—against 
employees’ legitimate exercise of section 7 rights. 
The Register-Guard I Board found that the Register-Guard did not 
tolerate use of its e-mail by employees to solicit other employees in 
support of nonunion groups or organizations, except for an employer-
sponsored United Way campaign.106  Thus, the employer’s 
enforcement of its CSP regarding both union president Prozanski’s e-
mail urging employees to wear green to support the union and her e-
mail asking employees to participate in the union’s entry in the local 
parade “did not discriminate along Section 7 lines.”107  The absence 
of evidence that the Register-Guard had allowed other groups or 
organizations to use the e-mail to solicit meant that there was no 
disparate treatment in the majority’s view.108  Ms. Prozanski’s e-mail 
seeking to clear up the facts surrounding a union rally that occurred 
the day before was not a solicitation.109  The Register-Guard I 
majority found, consequently, the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) 
and (3) when it enforced its CSP with respect to that missive by 
issuing Ms. Prozanski a warning for sending a union-related e-
mail.110  This conclusion stemmed from the fact that the CSP merely 
prohibited “‘nonjob-related [sic] solicitations’ [and] not all non-job-
related communications.”111  Ms. Prozanski’s later e-mails that called 
for employees to act in support of the union were not protected 
 
106 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1119, 1119 n.23. 
107 Id. at 1119. 
108 Id. at 1119 n.24. 
109 Id. at 1119. 
110 Id. 
111 Id.; see also infra note 353 and accompanying text (discussing the affirmation of the 
Board’s finding on this issue by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals). 
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activities under section 7, the majority wrote; therefore, the 
employer’s discipline regarding these two was lawful.112 
2.  The Dissent 
Members Wilma Liebman and Dennis Walsh dissented in part in 
the Register-Guard I decision.113  They took exception to the 
majority’s treatment of e-mail as just a piece of communications 
equipment like bulletin boards, telephones, or scraps of paper, a 
concept they felt failed to consider how e-mail has “revolutionized 
communication . . . within and outside the workplace.”114  The dissent 
would find that, when an employer gives “employees access to e-mail 
for regular, routine use in their work,” a ban on using e-mail for non-
job-related solicitations should be “presumptively unlawful absent 
special circumstances.”115  The strongly worded dissent also took 
exception to the majority’s “overruling of bedrock Board precedent 
about the meaning of discrimination as applied to Section 8(a)(1).”116  
The majority’s test would permit a rule that would allow employee 
use “for a broad range of nonwork-related [sic] communications but 
not for Section 7 communications.”117  The dissent noted that the 
Register-Guard’s CSP was enforced only against union solicitations 
and union-related communication.118  Personal, non-work-related 
communications of all kinds were permitted, including organizing a 
poker group and party invitations.119  The dissent noted that “[e]xcept 
 
112 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1119.  The Register-Guard I majority both 
overturned the ALJ on this point and also overturned the ALJ’s finding of violations of 
section 8(a)(1) and (5) that were based upon  the employer’s insistence on an unlawful 
bargaining proposal, specifically one that prohibited use of the employer’s e-mail for 
union business.  Id. at 1120.  The majority found there was insufficient evidence of 
insistence that the proposal was a condition of entering into an agreement, and, thus, there 
was no reason to evaluate the proposal’s lawfulness.  Id.  They also found there was 
insufficient evidence that the proposal impeded negotiations on lawful subjects, again 
noting that, under the circumstances, it was not necessary to rule on the lawfulness of that 
proposal itself.  Id. at 1120, 1120 n.28; see also infra notes 350–58 and accompanying text 
(discussing that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s conclusion that the 
company’s discipline of Ms. Prozanski for sending the latter two e-mails was lawful). 
113 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, 
dissenting). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1122. 
119 Id. 
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with respect to union activity . . . the CSP was honored (and enforced) 
in the breach.”120 
The dissent analyzed the facts in the case from the perspective of 
the status of Suzi Prozanski as a bargaining unit employee and as a 
union president—as well as evaluating the conduct that was 
disciplined.121  The employer issued Ms. Prozanski her first written 
warning for her use of company equipment and its e-mail system, 
even though the message was composed and sent on her break 
time.122  The Register-Guard wrote that Ms. Prozanski violated the 
CSP by using the e-mail for union business and further noted that this 
would lead employees to think that it was permissible to use the e-
mail for “purposes other than company business.”123  “And, of 
course, that’s not true.”124  Ms. Prozanski’s two other e-mails were 
composed and sent from the union office but utilized the company’s 
e-mail addresses and its system.125  The employer’s written warning 
with respect to these e-mails stated that she had violated the CSP and 
demanded that she “‘stop using the system for dissemination of union 
information.’”126  It is noteworthy both that the employer 
characterized sending the e-mails as “dissemination” when the 
employer’s policy specifically sought to prohibit “solicitation” and 
that the employer singled out “union information” as the material to 
be prohibited.127  Dissemination seems to be more akin to distribution 
than to solicitation. 
a.  The Appropriate Balancing Test—Employee Solicitation not 
Nonemployee Access and Distribution 
The Board’s General Counsel contended that the Register-Guard’s 
CSP violated section 8(a)(1) because it was “unlawfully 
 
120 Id.; see also infra notes 357–58 and accompanying text (The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted that singling out union activity for discipline was discrimination.). 
121 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1122. 
122 Id.  This was the May 4th e-mail. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id.; see also supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (discussing the language of 
the CSP); infra notes 352–59 and accompanying text (discussing D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’s dissatisfaction with the company’s “post hoc” rationale for its discipline 
stemming from Ms. Prozanski’s two latter e-mails). 
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overbroad.”128  The administrative law judge dismissed this 
allegation, and the Register-Guard I majority affirmed.129  The 
dissenters noted that the key to a section 8(a)(1) case is the 
interference with section 7 rights.130  Employees have a right to 
communicate about matters protected under section 7, and, where an 
employer’s conduct or practice interferes with section 7 rights, “the 
employer must demonstrate a legitimate business reason that 
outweighs the interference.”131  The dissent urged both that it is the 
Board’s job to balance employees’ section 7 rights to communicate 
against the employer’s business interests and that “[l]imitations on 
communications should not be ‘more restrictive than necessary’ to 
protect the employer’s interests.”132 
The dissenters advocated using the test for oral solicitation in the 
workplace from Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB.133  The oral 
solicitation test presumes that a restriction “on nonworking time [is] 
unlawful, absent special circumstances.”134  In Republic Aviation, 
even though the employee solicitation occurred on employer property, 
the Supreme Court deemed this justification to be inadequate for an 
employer prohibition.135  The Court upheld the Board’s decision, 
noting that an employer may make “reasonable rules” regarding 
actions during working time, but, outside working hours, an employee 
may use any time as desired “‘without unreasonable restraint, 
although the employee is on company property.’”136  The Register-
Guard I dissent noted that the “‘special circumstances’” from the 
Republic Aviation decision that might necessitate a rule banning 
solicitation during nonwork time would be “‘in order to maintain 
production or discipline.’”137  While Republic Aviation involved a 
total ban on solicitation, the dissent reflected that lesser employer 
restrictions on employee solicitation at work may survive scrutiny, for 
 
128 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1123. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (citing Caesar’s Palace, 336 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 n.6 (2001); Jeannette Corp. v. 
NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d Cir. 1976)). 
132 Id. (citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 502–03 (1978)). 
133 Id. at 1123–24 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)). 
134 Id. at 1124. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. (quoting Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 n.10) (emphasis added in the 
Register-Guard I dissent). 
137 Id. (quoting Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 n.10). 
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example restricting solicitation to nonpatient areas of a hospital or 
noncustomer, or nonpublic, areas of a restaurant or business.138 
The dissent cited NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., noting that the 
treatment of nonemployee organizers on company property requires a 
different balancing test than that afforded to communication among 
employees.139  Employers may restrict “‘nonemployee distribution of 
union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other 
available channels of communication will enable it to reach the 
employees with its message and if the employer’s notice or order does 
not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.’”140  
The Register-Guard I dissent emphasized the distinction the Supreme 
Court made between employees and nonemployees, establishing that 
the test for restricting employee communication must be “‘necessary 
to maintain production or discipline.’”141  Since employees are 
rightfully on the employer’s property, the employer’s management 
interests are at stake, rather than the employer’s property interests.142 
The dissent took issue with the Register-Guard I majority’s use of 
the nonemployee test rather than the employee test—with the 
majority satisfying itself that “the employees had other means of 
communication available.”143  Such is not the appropriate inquiry, 
and, as the Board’s General Counsel urged, the employer’s broad ban 
on employee e-mail use should be presumptively unlawful under the 
Republic Aviation evaluation.144  The dissent outlined three problems 
with the majority’s analysis, beginning with its failure to accept the 
importance of e-mail communication both inside and outside of the 
modern workplace.  The dissent argued that e-mail is not just 
workplace equipment but rather it is a different tool, and, thus, the test 
used in cases evaluating other workplace equipment does not 
apply.145  In addition, the dissent noted that the employer’s property 
interest in the equipment is not sufficient to exclude section 7 e-mails, 
nor is the “reasonable alternative means” test appropriate in this 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (citing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)). 
140 Id. (quoting Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added in the 
Register-Guard I dissent). 
141 Id. (quoting Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. at 113). 
142 Id. (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 n.10 (1976)). 
143 Id. at 1125. 
144 Id. at 1124. 
145 Id. at 1125. 
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context.146  E-mail is how people communicate at work today, and the 
section 7 rights of employees should not be interfered with unless a 
legitimate business reason outweighs them.147  The dissent found the 
Register-Guard failed to establish that employee use of the e-mail for 
section 7 matters would interfere with its property rights or cause it 
economic or other harm.148  According to the dissent, the majority’s 
use of equipment cases seemed backward looking and unrealistic 
rather than keeping up with “‘changing patterns of industrial life,’” 
which is the Board’s responsibility.149  Reliance on the employer’s 
property rights in its e-mail system should not provide an “absolute 
right to exclude Section 7 e-mails,” particularly where the employees 
have computers and routinely use e-mail for communication at 
work.150  The dissent further distinguished e-mail from other on-site 
equipment by pointing out that e-mail travels through cyberspace, 
which the employer does not own, and the system accommodates 
simultaneous users, unlike telephones.151 
There is a significant difference between the communication rights 
of employees and nonemployees; the majority was incorrect to apply 
the alternative means of communication test from nonemployee cases 
to the rights of employees to communicate via e-mail.152  The dissent 
would presume that a broad ban on “all nonwork-related [sic] 
‘solicitations’ is presumptively unlawful absent special 
circumstances.”153  The presumption could be rebutted with evidence 
of an employer’s legitimate business interest.154  But there was no 
unreasonable burden shown to establish an employer’s legitimate 
business interest in excluding section 7 matters from the employer’s 
e-mail in the Register-Guard I case.155  The dissent pointed out that 
employers could institute rules that would prohibit large attachments 
 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1125 n.6 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 
(1945); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 494 (1978); Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 
532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d Cir.1976)). 
148 Id. at 1126–27. 
149 See id. at 1125 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)). 
150 Id. at 1126. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1126–27. 
153 Id. at 1127. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  The dissenters pointed out that they would “require specific evidence to support 
. . . an [employer’s] assertion” that a server’s capacity was so limited that text e-mails 
would interfere with its functioning or the like.  Id. at 1127, 1127 n.16. 
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or other items that might interfere with the efficiency of the 
system.156  As with oral solicitations, a rule that would limit non-
work-related e-mails to nonwork time would be presumed lawful.  
The Register-Guard CSP, however, limited all non-job-related 
solicitations, so this limitation would appear to prohibit even those e-
mails sent on nonwork time.  The dissent noted that Board precedent 
on oral solicitations permits employees to solicit on company 
property on nonworking time but, with regard to distribution of flyers 
and printed material, restrictions can limit distribution to nonworking 
time and nonworking areas.157  The dissent would reverse the 
administrative law judge’s ruling and find that the employer’s 
maintenance of the Communications Systems Policy regarding use of 
e-mail for non-job-related solicitations itself violated section 
8(a)(1).158 
b.  The Test for Discriminatory Enforcement of a Workplace Rule 
The employer’s enforcement of the CSP was also discriminatory, 
the dissent asserted.159  The dissenters disagreed with the majority’s 
adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s limited analysis of discrimination as 
well as how the majority applied that court’s test.160  The dissent 
would follow Board precedent that an employer violates section 7 if it 
allows employees to use employer equipment for nonwork purposes 
while prohibiting section 7 use.161  The majority would allow an 
employer to draw a line between various types of solicitations as the 
employer sees fit, thus permitting the Register-Guard CSP because 
the company purported to ban all organizational solicitations, not just 
union ones.  At the same time, all kinds of non-work-related personal 
 
156 Id. at 1127. 
157 Id. at 1127 n.15 (citing Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962)). 
158 Id. at 1127; see also infra notes 360–63 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
legality of the CSP was not appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals; however, now-
Chairman Liebman’s posture on the CSP, as evidenced in the Register-Guard I dissent, 
may prove more influential in future cases). 
159 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1127; see also infra notes 350–59 and 
accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’s opinion, which aligned 
with the Register-Guard I dissent on the discriminatory enforcement issue). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 1127–28 (citing, e.g., Richmond Times-Dispatch, 346 N.L.R.B. 74, 76 (2005), 
enforced, 225 F. App’x 144 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (found an employer 
violation of section 8(a)(1) where non-work-related e-mail messages were permitted but 
union-related messages were prohibited)). 
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messages were permitted.162  In analyzing the two Seventh Circuit 
cases that the majority relied upon, the dissent noted that both cases 
involved a failure of the appellate court to enforce Board orders.163  
In both Guardian Industries Corp. and Fleming Co., the employer 
policies regarding bulletin boards excluded organizational notices.164  
In Fleming, the employer permitted personal postings in practice 
despite a “company business purposes only” policy, yet the court 
found this was not discriminatory because union notices fell within 
the broader category of prohibited organizational notices.165 
The Register-Guard I dissent pointed out that the National Labor 
Relations Act creates “affirmative right[s] to engage in concerted 
group action for mutual benefit and protection.”166  Where an 
employer’s conduct “reasonably tended to interfere with those 
affirmative Section 7 rights . . . the burden is on the employer to 
demonstrate a legitimate and substantial business justification for its 
conduct.”167  No improper motive must be established under section 
8(a)(1), rather motive is relevant in section 8(a)(3) cases, according to 
the dissent.168  It is not important to categorize activities as “equal,” 
because the mere interference with section 7 rights is the “essence” of 
a violation of section 8(a)(1) absent a showing of a “business 
justification that outweighs the infringement.”169  As the dissent 
noted, discrimination is a relevant factor when weighing whether the 
employer’s business justification is a pretext rather than the key 
issue.170 
The dissent emphasized that where employees are involved, rather 
than nonemployees, the employer’s managerial interests in production 
and discipline are implicated rather than simply the company’s 
property interests.171  If the employer draws lines regarding permitted 
and prohibited categories of e-mails and section 7 e-mails are within 
the category of prohibited e-mails, then there should be a legitimate 
 
162 Id. at 1128. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1128–29. 
166 Id. at 1129. 
167 Id. (citing Caesar’s Palace, 336 N.L.R.B. 271, 272 n.6 (2001); Jeannette Corp. v. 
NLRB, 532 F.2d 916, 918 (3d Cir. 1976)). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1129 n.22, 1130 n.24. 
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business reason for those lines.172  Without this reason, “the 
employer’s rule is . . . antithetical to Section 7’s protection of 
concerted activity,” even in the absence of anti-union motive, 
according to the dissent.173  The employer’s enforcement of its CSP 
violated section 8(a)(1) with respect to all three of Ms. Prozanski’s e-
mails.174  Because the Register-Guard allowed personal solicitations 
that violated the CSP, singled out union solicitations for censure, and 
never “enforced the CSP against anything other than union-related 
messages,” this discipline was unlawful discrimination even under the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis.175 
In addition to violating section 8(a)(1), the employer’s discipline of 
Ms. Prozanski violated section 8(a)(3).  The dissent deemed the 
disciplinary warnings unlawful because the CSP itself was unlawful 
on its face, enforcement of the policy was discriminatory, and 
discipline pursuant to the CSP violated sections 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(3).176  In conclusion, the dissent faulted the majority’s failure to 
“‘adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life’”177 by both 
ignoring the fact that e-mail is a “primary means of workplace 
communication” and allowing employers “virtually unlimited 
discretion to exclude Section 7 communications, so long as the 
employer couches its rule in facially neutral terms.”178 
3.  Comparing the Majority and Dissenting Opinions 
The difference between the majority and dissenting views in the 
Register-Guard I decision is significant.  The Register-Guard I 
majority gives employers broad latitude to control and regulate their 
property interests in their communications systems.  The majority 
would allow categories of permissible and prohibited activities in an 
employer policy to withstand legal scrutiny as long as the categories 
are not facially discriminatory.  Just one member of the majority 
 
172 Id. at 1130. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 1131. 
175 Id. (emphasis in original).  Because the issue of the CSP’s legality was not appealed, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the issue, but the court did agree with 
the Register-Guard I dissent’s view that, even under the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, the 
singling out of union activity for enforcement of the policy was discriminatory.  See infra 
notes 358–59 and accompanying text. 
176 Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1131. 
177 Id. at 1132 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)). 
178 Id. at 1132. 
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reflected on the relevance of the effect that allowing such categories 
would have on section 7 activities.  Further, the majority applied tests 
appropriate to nonemployee, as opposed to employee, communication 
and refused to distinguish between solicitation and distribution 
precedents.  In contrast, the dissent would apply the balancing test for 
employees engaging in solicitation, thus requiring a legitimate 
business reason for a communications systems policy that excludes 
section 7 communications while simultaneously allowing other 
personal, nonbusiness e-mails on the employer’s e-mail system. 
The dissent in Register-Guard I saw e-mail as a totally different 
medium than a bulletin board, the medium involved in the cases from 
the Seventh Circuit upon which the majority relied for its test of 
discriminatory enforcement.  E-mail is the predominant mode of 
communication in many workplaces, the new “water cooler” around 
which employees gather to communicate, so the dissent advocated 
that the Board should keep pace with and adapt both the Act and its 
interpretation of rules to encompass the importance of such new 
technologies.179 
II 
ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT CASES FROM THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
CIRCUIT 
The Board’s Register-Guard I decision was appealed to the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.180  From the outset of the 
appeal, there was reason to believe that the Board’s decision would 
not withstand the appellate court’s scrutiny.  Labor law professors at 
an American Bar Association meeting criticized the Board’s decision 
in Register-Guard I and predicted that it would not survive judicial 
review.181  One theoretical weakness in the Register-Guard I 
majority’s opinion is that the Seventh Circuit decisions relied upon by 
the Board majority, namely Guardian Industries Corp. and Fleming 
 
179 Id. at 1125 (citing Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor 
Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2000) (discussing e-mail as new water cooler, which has largely displaced 
face-to-face discussion)). 
180 Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB (Register-Guard II), 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
181 See Dube, supra note 9, at C-1.  This view proved prescient at least as far as the 
discriminatory enforcement aspect of the case was concerned.  See infra notes 349–63 
(discussing the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Register-Guard II). 
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Co., dealt with bulletin boards, not e-mail.182  As the dissent noted, e-
mail is a very different medium of communication than a workplace 
bulletin board—or even a work telephone.183  Because of the 
prevalence and popularity of e-mail as a mode of communication in 
the modern-day workplace, it seems that the impact of restricting the 
use of e-mail for section 7 purposes would be far greater than similar 
restrictions on bulletin board use. 
Another weakness regarding the decisions from the Seventh Circuit 
that the Register-Guard I majority relied upon is that the 
discriminatory enforcement test enunciated there was later eroded by 
a recent decision from the same circuit, St. Margaret Mercy 
Healthcare Centers v. NLRB,184 discussed below.  Further, the 
Register-Guard I majority’s failure to address Board precedent on 
employer restrictions regarding solicitation and distribution by 
employees at work presents yet another ideological weakness, one 
that narrows the practical and precedential value of the majority’s 
opinion.  Finally, the majority’s overemphasis on the employer’s 
property interests at the expense of the employees’ section 7 rights 
undermines the credibility of the majority opinion.  No balancing of 
interests is allowed because of the majority’s presumption that when 
the employer owns the system the employer is entitled to control it, 
and there is no violation of the Act unless there is substantial evidence 
of overt discrimination. 
A.  Precedents from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: 
From Bulletin Boards to Solicitation and Distribution in Health Care 
Institutions 
In Guardian Industries, Judge Easterbrook’s decision considered 
whether an employer should have to acquiesce to use of its bulletin 
board for union organizational purposes simply because it has 
extended to employees limited, indirect access to the bulletin 
board.185  His opinion discussed the employer’s ability to control 
activities in the workplace because of its property rights in the 
business and building, as well as the employer’s contractual rights to 
 
182 Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 318 (7th Cir. 1995); Fleming Co. v. 
NLRB, 349 F.3d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 2003). 
183 See Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1125 (Liebman and Walsh, Members, 
dissenting) (noting the absurdity of equating e-mail to telephone, bulletin boards, etc.). 
184 519 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2008). 
185 Guardian Indus. Corp., 49 F.3d at 318–19. 
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maintain rules for its employees.186  Section 7 rights protect 
organizational rights, as well as the right to oppose a union campaign, 
but section 7 rights do not entitle labor organizations to use a medium 
of communication in the workplace just because the employer uses 
it.187  Judge Easterbrook analogized that just as the government need 
not subsidize political parties, employers need not provide access to 
promote a union.188 
The key issue then for Judge Easterbrook’s analysis is whether the 
employer is discriminating against speech and organizational efforts.  
If access to the employer’s bulletin board is given to others, the Board 
ruled that the employer must also allow notices relating to labor 
organization.189  The Seventh Circuit in Guardian Industries found 
fault with the NLRB’s definition of “discrimination,” labeling it 
idiosyncratic and different from the use of the term in other legal 
settings.190  The Guardian Industries opinion noted both that the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepted the Board’s view that, 
where employees had access to bulletin boards for other purposes, 
section 7 secures the employees’ right to post union materials and that 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also followed the Board’s 
view on this issue.191  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
questioned the “sweep” of the Board’s policy but still enforced a 
similar Board order.192  Up until the Guardian Industries case, the 
Seventh Circuit had reserved judgment on the issue.193  Judge 
Easterbrook noted that the Board used the language of disparate 
treatment rather than disparate impact in the Guardian Industries 
case.194  The NLRB, in its decision, did not indicate that Guardian’s 
policy had a disparate impact on unions, unlike the across-the-board 
non-solicitation policy that the Supreme Court ruled effectively 
prevented unions from communicating in the Republic Aviation 
case.195  The Board would find that once an employer accepts other 
 
186 Id. at 318. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 319. 
190 Id. at 320. 
191 Id. at 321 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1983); 
NLRB v. Honeywell, Inc., 722 F.2d 405, 406 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
192 Id. (citing NLRB v. Southwire Co., 801 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 320. 
195 Id. (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)). 
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notices for the bulletin board, then it must accept union meeting 
announcements or else the employer is engaging in discrimination.196 
In Guardian Industries, the Seventh Circuit referred to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in a public-sector employment case where 
a public employer that opened its internal e-mail system to 
communications about civic and church meetings was not required to 
keep it open to communications on behalf of unions.197  The fact that 
the permitted postings in Guardian Industries were swap-and-shop 
notices rather than organizational notices was significant in the 
Seventh Circuit’s view because the permitted and prohibited postings 
were not of a similar character.198  The Guardian Industries court 
found that “the Board has taken its own definition [of discrimination] 
to the logical limit.  It has gone too far.  Distinguishing between for-
sale notices and announcements of all meetings, of all organizations, 
does not discriminate against the employees’ right of self-
organization.”199  The court said that “the Board could create a rule 
that does not depend on the idea of ‘discrimination,’” mentioned the 
Board’s “latitude to adopt rules adjusting the balance between labor 
and management,” and noted that even “nondiscriminatory regulation 
of solicitation in the workplace may diminish to an unacceptable 
degree employees’ ability to communicate with each other about 
organization.”200  The Guardian Industries court concluded that the 
antidiscrimination principle, the sole principle advanced for the 
Board’s order, was simply not adequate to support the order.201 
The Seventh Circuit’s second decision referenced by the Register-
Guard I majority, Fleming Co. v. NLRB,202 was also a bulletin board 
case rather than an e-mail case.  The Fleming Co. decision noted that 
the Guardian Industries court “explicitly rejected the position” that 
when an employer allows employees any access, then it must permit 
 
196 Id. at 321. 
197 Id. at 320 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 
(1983)). 
198 Id. at 321. 
199 Id. at 321–22. 
200 Id. at 322.  This is particularly interesting language from the Guardian Industries 
decision because it implies that an overbroad no-solicitation policy, even when 
“nondiscriminatory,” may be legally problematic if it decreases employees’ ability to 
engage in organizing activities.  Thus, the effect of the policy, rather than the motive for it, 
is emphasized by the Seventh Circuit. 
201 See id. 
202 349 F.3d 968 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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union postings.203  In Guardian Industries, the court recognized that a 
company allowing postings of “a similar character to union materials” 
would then not be able to discriminate against union postings.204  
Since the permitted notices in Guardian Industries involved “for-
sale” notices, rather than organizational notices, there was no 
discrimination.205 
In Fleming Co., Judge Rovner wrote that any category of notices 
that is distinct from organizational notices could be allowed by an 
employer without discriminating against the posting of union 
materials.206  The court found that “a rule banning all organizational 
notices . . . is impossible to understand as disparate treatment of 
unions.”207  In Fleming Co., the employer had a written policy that 
prohibited the posting of any noncompany material on the bulletin 
boards, but, in actual practice, personal notices were posted without 
enforcement of the written policy.208  Nonetheless, no organizational 
or club notices were permitted, and the court found that the exclusion 
of organizational notices did not amount to disparate treatment of 
unions in light of its decision in Guardian Industries.209  The 
appellate court so ruled despite the Board’s finding that removing the 
union literature from the company bulletin boards violated section 
8(a)(1).210 
Three months after the Board’s decision in Register-Guard I, Judge 
Posner authored an opinion for the Seventh Circuit that retreated from 
the discriminatory enforcement standard applied in both the Guardian 
Industries and Fleming Co. decisions—the very standard that the 
majority relied upon in Register-Guard I.211  In St. Margaret Mercy 
 
203 Id. at 975. 
204 Id. (citing Guardian Indus. Corp., 49 F.3d at 320). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. (quoting Guardian Indus. Corp., 49 F.3d at 320). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 975–76.  The administrative law judge’s opinion in Register-Guard I cited the 
Board’s position in Fleming Co., 336 N.L.R.B. at 193–94, that if an employer permits 
employees to use its communications equipment for nonbusiness use, then it may not 
prohibit use for section 7 purposes.  Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 
1110, 1128 (2007). 
211 St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs. v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 373, 374 (7th Cir. 2008).  
The panel included Judge Easterbrook who authored the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in 
Guardian Industries.  The St. Margaret’s decision proved influential in the Register-
Guard I appeal.  See infra notes 349–59 and accompanying text (discussing Guard Publ’g 
Co. v. NLRB (Register-Guard II), 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
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Healthcare Centers v. NLRB, the Seventh Circuit expressed a 
different view for discriminatory enforcement of a no-solicitation rule 
against pro-union soliciting than the standard of discrimination the 
court outlined in Guardian Industries and Fleming Co.212  In the St. 
Margaret decision, Judge Posner described how the Board found the 
hospital interfered with the right of nurses to organize and 
discriminated against a nurse who was a union activist.213  The 
interference and discrimination violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) 
respectively, according to the Board.214  The court further noted that 
“[d]etermining when an employer is unlawfully interfering with 
organizing activities requires weighing the employees’ interest in 
organizing against the interest of the employers and others (such as, in 
this case, the hospital’s patients) in being free from disruptive 
interference by union organizers in the operation of the employer’s 
business.”215  The employer in St. Margaret had a lawful no-
solicitation/distribution rule that prohibited these activities in patient 
care areas, including halls and corridors adjacent to patient and 
treatment rooms.216  Employees on break were permitted to solicit in 
nonwork areas that included “employee break areas.”217  The Board 
found that the hospital forbid employees from engaging in union 
activities in the employee break rooms or multipurpose rooms.218  
Because the break rooms were adjacent to patient rooms (across the 
corridor), the hospital defended its prohibition based upon its concern 
that the activity in the break rooms could be heard in “patient care 
areas.”219  The court, however, noted that a closed door could redress 
that concern.220 
Further, with respect to the instance of discrimination against a 
nurse who solicited for the union at the nurses’ station, it was shown 
that other charitable and commercial solicitations had been allowed in 
 
212 See St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., 519 F.3d at 373; see also Susan J. 
McGolrick, Seventh Circuit Affirms that Hospital Illegally Applied 
Solicitation/Distribution Rule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 48, at AA-1 (Mar. 12, 2008) 
(discussing the St. Margaret case). 
213 St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., 519 F.3d at 374. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 374–75. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 375. 
220 Id. 
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the same area.221  The permitted solicitations at the nurses’ station 
included Girl Scout cookies, March of Dimes, United Way, 
Secretary’s and Boss’s Days, going away parties, birthday parties, and 
other social occasion solicitations.222  In addition, a beach balm 
product, created by a nurse to “‘control bikini line irritation,’” was 
sold at the station.223  Management was aware of all these 
solicitations and, as Judge Posner noted, participated in some of 
them.224  Judge Posner questioned why charitable or social, as well as 
commercial, solicitations should be treated differently from union 
solicitations.225 
Union solicitations were the only ones that were subjected to 
rebuke even though the rule prohibited all solicitations in patient care 
areas.226  Judge Posner noted that 
it is far from obvious that a patient in intensive care will be less 
disturbed by a nurse hawking bikini lotion or organizing a birthday 
party than by a union organizer.  Patients, especially those in 
intensive care, and their family members and friends, would like to 
think that nurses when on duty give their exclusive attention to their 
professional duties and are not distracted by engaging in charitable, 
social, or commercial activities.227 
The St. Margaret decision focused on the discriminatory 
enforcement aspect of the no-solicitation policy rather than on the 
legality of the policy itself, much the same focus as in Case 2: 
Community Medical Centers, from the General Counsel’s 
memorandum that is discussed in Part III of this Article, and in the 
Register-Guard I case as presented on appeal.228  In St. Margaret, 
 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id.  Judge Posner noted, rather tongue-in-cheek, in the text of the decision that: 
We are particularly struck by the hawking of “beach balm,” a product “created 
by a registered nurse to control bikini line irritation” and optimized for “anyone 
who shaves or waxes bikini lines.”  (Consumers will doubtless be reassured to 
learn that beach balm is “natural, safe, and tested by nurses, not on animals!”). 
Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 375–76. 
228 See infra notes 275–80 and accompanying text (discussing Case 2 in the GC 
Memorandum).  The same presentation of issues occurred in the Register-Guard I appeal, 
and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the discriminatory enforcement issue in 
like manner, citing to the Seventh Circuit’s St. Margaret decision.  See infra notes 349–63 
and accompanying text (discussing the appellate decision). 
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Case 2, and Register-Guard I, it was clear that the only activity that 
resulted in a warning or discipline was section 7 activity.  Conduct 
that was prohibited by the employer policy was permitted to occur 
except for cases where there was union solicitation or union-related e-
mails.  To paraphrase an administrative law judge in another recent 
case, Stephens Media, LLC, even the Seventh Circuit could see that 
where the union activity was the only activity prohibited, or the only 
activity for which an employee was disciplined, this was 
discrimination.229  The application of the no-solicitation rule to 
employee break rooms (nonpatient areas) in St. Margaret during 
nonwork time was held to be unlawful.230  Because the activity in St. 
Margaret was classified as solicitation, it was treated as such, 
whereas in Register-Guard I, the Board majority avoided such 
classification and the consequent Board precedent that provides 
protection for these important section 7 employee rights.231  The tone 
of the St. Margaret decision reflected the court’s exasperation with 
the employer’s poorly supported rationale for its selective 
enforcement of its rule.  The court poked holes in the hospital’s 
purported reasoning and openly questioned why some activities were 
permitted while union activities were not.  One weakness of the St. 
Margaret decision is that it is too brief.  Perhaps because the case 
seemed to be such a straightforward instance of discrimination against 
union activity, the Seventh Circuit never referred to the 
discriminatory enforcement standard it previously applied in the 
Guardian Industries or Fleming Co. decisions—the standard that the 
Board adopted in Register-Guard I. 
B.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: A Hospital’s 
Ban on Nonemployee Solicitation Discriminates Against Unions 
In Lucile Salter Packard Children’s Hospital v. NLRB, the 
employer sought to set aside an NLRB decision and order that the 
employer had violated the Act by its discriminatory enforcement of a 
 
229 See infra notes 336–41 and accompanying text (discussing Stephens Media, LLC, 
2008 WL 649133, at *17 (NLRB Div. of Judges Mar. 6, 2008)). 
230 St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., 519 F.3d at 374–75; see also McGolrick, 
supra note 212, at AA-1 to AA-2 (discussing the illegal application of a no-
solicitation/distribution rule to break rooms). 
231 See Guard Publ’g Co. (Register Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121–22 (2007) 
(Liebman and Walsh, Members, dissenting).  The dissent objected that the majority’s use 
of equipment cases, rather than classifying the activity as oral solicitation, distribution, or 
both, resulted in sanctioning employer prohibition of protected activities. 
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ban on nonemployee solicitation and distribution on hospital property 
at any time.232  Despite the written policy, the hospital permitted 
other outsiders that were not labor unions, such as credit unions, 
insurers, family care resources, and textbook publishers, to solicit and 
set up displays.233  It also allowed vendors to sell wares across from 
the hospital cafeteria as part of an employer-sponsored, employee 
activity committee fund-raising opportunity.234  When the hospital 
refused an American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees union access for solicitation or distribution, the union filed 
an unfair labor practice charge alleging discriminatory application of 
the no-solicitation rule.235 
In Lucille Salter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) 
outlined the general rules that apply to nonemployee solicitation and 
distribution, noting that employers may not be required to permit such 
unless: (1) “the union has no other reasonable means of 
communicating its message” or (2) the employer discriminates against 
a union by denying it access while allowing access by other 
nonemployee entities.236  The D.C. Circuit focused upon the second 
discrimination exception and noted a narrow exclusion to an 
otherwise absolute policy may not be in violation of the Act if it 
permits “‘a few isolated instances of charitable solicitation.’”237  The 
D.C. Circuit also noted that there may be permissible solicitations that 
relate to the employer’s business function and purpose, including 
pharmaceutical and textbook displays, blood drives, and fund-raising 
sales.238  The ALJ and the Board found that neither of these 
exceptions immunized the hospital from a section 8(a)(1) violation, 
and the circuit court held that there was substantial evidence to 
support this finding.239  The permissible solicitations that related to 
employee fringe benefits were not violations because they were 
integral to the hospital’s business functions and purposes.240  Other 
outside solicitations by credit union, insurance, and employee activity 
committee-sponsored vendors were permitted by the employer despite 
 
232 97 F.3d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 587. 
237 Id. (quoting Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
238 Id. at 588. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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the absolute no-solicitation rule, while the union was simultaneously 
excluded.241  This amounted to unlawful discrimination under the 
NLRA.242 
The court refused to allow “‘a wide variety of nonbeneficent, 
commercial solicitations bearing no arguable connection to its 
business’” as the employer requested, while, at the same time, union 
solicitation was prohibited.243  The “small number of isolated 
‘beneficent acts’” exception is a narrow one, the D.C. Circuit 
ruled.244  The court in Lucile Salter found that the Board 
drew a reasonable distinction between solicitations regarding 
benefits paid for in whole or in part by the Hospital, which the ALJ 
found to be “intimately related” to the Hospital’s regular benefit 
package, and the solicitations at issue here, which involve products 
and services purchased out of the employees’ own pockets.245 
The D.C. Circuit refused to allow “a subjective criterion to govern 
access [to] eviscerate section 8(a)(1)’s purpose of preventing 
discriminatory treatment of unions by employers who permit other 
nonemployee entities to solicit on the employer’s property.”246  The 
court agreed with the Board’s assessment that the hospital had a 
“subjective preference” rather than a “meaningful basis for 
distinguishing between the solicitations.”247  Nor was the court 
persuaded that the solicitations supported by the employee activities 
committee were related to hospital business purposes “because they 
enhance morale by keeping employees happy and productive.”248 
The D.C. Circuit found the “for sale” notice precedent of Guardian 
Industries Corp. inapposite to the situation in Lucile Salter because, 
in Guardian Industries, all outside entities were treated similarly with 
 
241 Id. at 590–91. 
242 Id.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that neither of the two 
exceptions to the NLRA’s nondiscrimination rule applied because there was not a small 
number of charitable or beneficent solicitations, rather the frequency was regular and the 
nature of most of the solicitations was commercial.  Id.  Secondly, the solicitation 
activities were not related to legitimate business functions and purposes of the employer.  
Id. 
243 Id. at 589 n.7. 
244 Id. at 589. 
245 Id. at 590. 
246 Id. at 591. 
247 Id. at 590 n.10. 
248 Id. at 591.  The court noted the Board’s convincing response to this improving 
morale argument was that the same could be said for a union.  Id. 
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respect to the posting ban, and, thus, there was no discrimination.249  
This was different from the Lucile Salter case because other 
nonemployee solicitations “indistinguishable in nature from Union 
solicitations” were permitted and union solicitations were not.250  
Similarly, the court in Lucile Salter dismissed the relevance of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Perry Education Ass’n to the hospital’s 
case because, in Perry, the groups permitted to use the employer’s e-
mail system “were integrally related to the school’s primary 
educational purpose.”251  The Lucille Salter Packard Children’s 
Hospital’s argument that a health care institution has a special need 
for a “peaceful, nondisruptive environment” also did not wash as far 
as the D.C. Circuit was concerned because, as the Board noted, it was 
not shown that the union solicitation would have been any more 
disruptive than those solicitations that were permitted.252  The court 
both found the hospital’s argument that union materials are 
“inherently disturbing and disruptive” to be “a value judgment pure 
and simple” and concluded that the hospital discriminated against the 
union “in its application of a purportedly absolute no-solicitation 
rule.”253 
In Lucile Salter, the court dealt with the discriminatory 
enforcement of what seemed to be a facially neutral rule that banned 
access to outsiders for solicitations and distributions.  Nonemployee 
access is often stricter than employee access and is permitted to be 
stricter by law, and yet the hospital allowed many kinds of 
nonemployee access in clear violation of its own no-solicitation 
rule—without what the D.C. Circuit deemed to be a “meaningful 
basis” for the distinction.  In Lucile Salter, the court upheld the 
Board’s determination that the hospital was discriminating with 
respect to its application of its rule.  This precedent regarding 
discriminatory enforcement was relevant to the Register-Guard’s 
appeal to the same circuit in Register-Guard II.  Just as in Lucile 
Salter, the Register-Guard policy was discriminatorily enforced 
against union use of the communications system, albeit in regards to 
 
249 Id. at 591–92. 
250 Id. at 592. 
251 Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) 
(involving public employer’s refusal to allow a union to use its e-mail system, which was 
deemed lawful)).  Perry was also cited by the Seventh Circuit in the Guardian Industries 
Corp. case. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
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use of the system rather than access to the employer’s facilities.  
While the Register-Guard I case involved employee use rather than 
use by nonemployees, it also involved a classification that excluded 
union solicitations while other non-job-related solicitations were 
allowed on the e-mail system.  Thus, there was a similar paradigm for 
discriminatory exclusion of union solicitations in both cases. 
The Register-Guard I majority focused on the employer’s property 
rights and its right to regulate and restrict employee use of company 
property.  The court in Lucile Salter looked for a “meaningful basis” 
for exclusions that barred unions from company property when other 
outside organizations were permitted on the property—a logical 
standard that the Register-Guard I majority did not require.  The 
Register-Guard I majority was content to allow employer restrictions 
as long as they were nondiscriminatory, applying a standard for 
discrimination that aligned with disparate treatment.254  The Register-
Guard I majority also reflected that employers need not allow access 
to a particular communication means simply because the employer 
uses it.255  Discrimination exists only if there is unequal treatment of 
equals, in the majority’s view, but the critical issue remains: Who 
determines what the “equals” are?256 
The Register-Guard I majority cited Lucile Salter for the 
proposition that there must be a demonstration that “‘the employer 
treated nonunion solicitations differently than union solicitations,’”257 
but the Lucile Salter decision, in fact, both set clear parameters for 
what is similar activity by other nonemployee entities within the facts 
of that case and noted that the two narrow exceptions to the NLRA’s 
nondiscrimination rule were not met by the hospital’s meaningless 
distinctions.258  In Lucile Salter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
254 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1113, 1116 (2007). 
255 Id. at 1113. 
256 See id. at 1116. 
257 Id. at 1118 (quoting Lucile Salter Packard Children’s Hosp. v. NLRB, 97 F.3d 583, 
587 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
258 Lucile Salter Packard Children’s Hosp., 97 F.3d at 592.  Another relevant case from 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned by the Eugene Newspaper Guild in its brief 
is that of Restaurant Corp. of America v. NLRB, 827 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  Brief for 
Petitioner Eugene Newspaper Guild at 9, Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB (Register-Guard II), 
571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 07-1528 & 08-1006).  The Guild noted that the “Board 
majority [in Register-Guard I] followed the very approach to applying the judicially 
developed antidiscrimination principle that this Court rejected over twenty years ago in 
Restaurant Corp. of America . . . and that the Seventh Circuit rejected recently in St. 
Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers.”  Id. at 16.  This was so because in Register-Guard I 
the CSP prohibited all non-job-related solicitations, yet the company only disciplined 
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wanted to know why the hospital felt that one type of solicitation was 
inherently more disturbing than another and the court was not 
prepared to accept the employer’s subjective value judgments.259 
Just as the Seventh Circuit opined with respect to discriminatory 
enforcement of a no-solicitation rule against an employee in the St. 
Margaret decision and as the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
indicated regarding discriminatory enforcement of a no-solicitation 
rule against nonemployees in Lucile Salter, employers need to have a 
logical or meaningful or, even better, a legitimate business reason for 
excluding union activity when similar nonunion activity is allowed.  
In the absence of such a reason, where the impact of the rule is to 
exclude section 7-protected activity but not exclude other nonsection 
7 activity, the employer is violating section 8(a)(1) of the Act.  Who 
defines the type of activity is critical to outcomes.  The Board is the 
agency vested with that responsibility, and any court of appeals will 
uphold the Board’s rational interpretation of the Act as applied to 
given fact patterns where the Board’s conclusions are supported by 
substantial evidence on the given record. 
III 
MEMORANDUM FROM THE BOARD’S GENERAL COUNSEL—CASES 
AFTER REGISTER-GUARD I 
Since the Board issued its decision in Register-Guard I, General 
Counsel Ronald Meisburg has been called upon to advise NLRB 
regional directors on a number of cases with related issues.  The 
General Counsel’s report on these cases provides significant guidance 
as to how the regional directors should proceed.260  In essence, the 
watchword on Register-Guard I seems to be that the agency is bound 
by it until either the composition of the Board changes or the Board 
revises its approach in light of the appellate court’s decision and 
remand in Register-Guard II.  At present, the General Counsel is 
applying the standard from Register-Guard I narrowly and focusing 
upon the facts surrounding any changes in policy or discriminatory 
enforcement—looking in particular for timing that coincides with 
 
union e-mails and not other non-job-related solicitations.  Id. at 23–24.  The Board 
majority offered no explanation for the after-the-fact distinctions made by the employer; 
distinctions that had nothing to do with any disruption of the workplace or maintenance of 
production and discipline.  See id. at 18–23. 
259 Id. 
260 GC Memorandum, supra note 11. 
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union activity—such that changes or selective discipline might 
indicate an anti-union motive.  Despite this approach, for the short 
term, the General Counsel remains tethered to the reasoning of 
Register-Guard I that provides employers with broad discretion to 
categorize and prohibit uses of its property that infringe on section 7 
rights, even in the absence of a legitimate business reason.  Cases that 
speak about restrictions on solicitation, as opposed to restrictions on 
the use of the employer’s e-mail, tend to have a more positive 
outcome for the protection of section 7 rights. 
The five cases submitted to the Division of Advice were done so 
pursuant to the General Counsel’s direction to the regional offices 
with the goal being to “assure a consistent approach to the 
interpretation of [the Register-Guard I] decision.”261  The five cases 
were reported with the names redacted, but I have included the actual 
names of the respondent companies that were obtained by a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request from the National Labor Relations 
Board, as well as information discovered by research on the 
background  and resolution of the actual cases.262 
A.  Case 1 – Chevron Phillips Chemical Co. 
The General Counsel upheld Chevron Phillips’s rule that prevented 
union officials from sending e-mails to company managers outside of 
 
261 Id. at 3. 
262 See Memorandum from Ronald Meisburg, NLRB General Counsel, to NLRB 
Division Heads, Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 7 (Apr. 17, 
2008), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/GC%20Memo/2008/GC%20%2008-
05%20Report%20on%20the%20Midwinter%20Mtg%20of%20the%20ABA%20P&P%20
Committee.pdf (discussing the General Counsel’s standards for disclosure of advice 
memos noting: that memos authorizing dismissal of charge allegations, absent withdrawal, 
are subject to disclosure under FOIA; that memos authorizing issuance of complaint, 
absent settlement, are internal agency work product and, as such, typically are not 
disclosed; and that, after a case is closed, the General Counsel, as a matter of discretion, 
may disclose a redacted version).  The General Counsel noted the high level of practitioner 
interest in how the Register-Guard I decision would be applied by his office and that he 
thought the subject warranted a report on how cases sent for advice since Register-Guard I 
have been handled.  GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2. 
 A telephone interview with National Labor Relations Board staff, namely Linda Kahn, 
resulted in the filing of a Freedom of Information Act request by Margo E.K. Reder, a 
Research Associate at Boston College, on May 27, 2008, and the actual names of the 
respondent companies were subsequently provided to the author by letter.  Telephone 
Interview with Linda Kahn, NLRB Staff Member, in Wash., D.C. (June 12, 2008); Letter 
from Jacqueline A. Young, Freedom of Info. Officer, NLRB, to Christine Neylon O’Brien 
(June 17, 2008) (All documents obtained are on file with the author.).  Thus, beyond the 
GC Memorandum, this section will discuss further facts and findings in these cases from 
complaints, decisions of administrative law judges, and current dispositions. 
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the unionized facility where the union represented a bargaining 
unit.263  The union had been allowed to use the e-mail system for 
union business regarding labor relations matters at the facility, 
including communicating with the employer.264 
The General Counsel found the employer’s rule lawful because it 
“concerned how the union was permitted to use the employer’s e-mail 
system and did not otherwise prohibit the union from engaging in 
protected communications outside the plant or to broad groups of 
managers.”265  “[T]he rule solely involved company equipment, and 
did not discriminate against union or Section 7 activity . . . .”266  The 
reference to company equipment reflects the emphasis of the majority 
in the Register-Guard I decision.  The General Counsel’s 
memorandum did not elaborate upon why the rule did not discriminate 
against the union or section 7 activities but followed the Register-
Guard I majority’s reasoning that, because the conduct occurred on 
company equipment, the company was free to establish restrictions 
with respect to its use.  As long as the category of activity in question 
was clearly delineated by the company policy, and the prohibited 
conduct was within that category, it would not be discrimination 
along section 7 lines if there was no comparable e-mail that was 
treated more favorably within that same category.  The standard of the 
majority in Register-Guard I did not require the employer to establish 
a legitimate business reason for the policy that outweighed the 
interference with section 7 activities. 
The Advice Memorandum in the Chevron case, much like the 
General Counsel’s memorandum, concluded that the “Employer’s 
rule was not unlawful because it narrowly concerned only the Union’s 
use of the Employer’s e-mail system and did not discriminatorily 
prohibit the Union from communicating outside the plant or to broad 
groups of managers.”267  The employer had “freely allowed the Union 
to use the company e-mail system” but then delivered a letter to the 
union stating that the broad distribution of e-mails constituted 
 
263 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. General Counsel, NLRB Div. of 
Advice, to Martha Kinard, Reg’l Dir., Region 16, at 1 (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Advice 
Memorandum], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/2008/ 
16-CA-25946.pdf. 
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inappropriate use.268  The employer cited examples of local plant 
issuance of e-mails to company officials outside the plant—e-mails 
about one supervisor or manager sent broadly to other managers not 
directly involved—and the employer noted that continued misuse 
“may result in the immediate suspension of your company e-mail 
account.”269 
The union initially responded to the employer that they would no 
longer use the company e-mail system but, in a later meeting, the 
union offered to use the system but keep local issues in plant and not 
send single-issue items to more than one manager, if the company 
would rescind their letter.270  In this context, “local issues” means that 
the union was offering to keep e-mails regarding issues within the 
same plant or facility where they occurred, and “single-issue items” 
were small matters that were only pertinent to one manager or 
supervisor.  The union was offering to keep these e-mails within the 
appropriate chain of command rather than allowing them to go to 
other managers as well.  The employer refused to rescind the letter 
and sent a second letter with its concerns.271  The Advice 
Memorandum noted that the Board held in Register-Guard I both that 
an employer’s e-mail system is company property and that 
“‘employees have no statutory right to use [it] for Section 7 
purposes.’”272  Pursuant to Register-Guard I, an employer may bar 
non-work-related use of its system, unless the employer “‘acts in a 
manner that discriminates against Section 7 activity.’”273  The Advice 
Memorandum concluded that Chevron Phillips’s rule was lawful 
because it only concerned company equipment and did not 
discriminate against union or section 7 activity.274 
B.  Case 2 – Community Medical Centers 
The General Counsel found that the Register-Guard I decision did 
not prevent issuance of a complaint regarding discriminatory 
enforcement of a facially valid no-solicitation rule at a health care 
 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. at 1–2. 
271 Id. at 2. 
272 Id. (quoting Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1110 (2007)). 
273 Id. (quoting Register-Guard I, 351 N.L.R.B. at 1116). 
274 Id. 
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institution, Community Medical Centers in California.275  The no-
solicitation rule prohibited solicitation “during working time and in 
immediate patient care areas.”276  The employer was inconsistent in 
enforcing its policy, choosing to warn and discipline employees 
soliciting for the union while allowing all other types of institutional, 
organizational, commercial, and personal solicitations.277  The 
General Counsel noted that, unlike the Register-Guard I case where 
the employer had not allowed solicitations for other groups or 
organizations, Community Medical Centers had allowed solicitations 
for a variety of groups and organizations but prohibited union-related 
solicitations.  There were also other allegations of section 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(3) violations that, if proven, might indicate the employer’s 
motive in banning the union solicitations was anti-union.278  The 
charge filed by the Service Employees International Union United 
Healthcare Workers-West alleged a violation of section 8(a)(1) for 
“enforcing a discriminatory and unlawful no-solicitation, no-
distribution policy.”279  The General Counsel memorandum focused 
on the discriminatory enforcement rather than any unlawfulness of the 
policy itself.280 
C.  Case 3 – Sutter Regional Medical Foundation 
Sutter Regional Medical Foundation’s policy was similar to the 
policy of Community Medical Centers, and the General Counsel 
again concluded that a complaint against the employer was not barred 
by the Board’s decision in Register-Guard I.281  The facts involved 
discriminatory repromulgation282 and disparate enforcement of what 
 
275 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4. 
276 Id. at 5. 
277 Id.  Commercial solicitations included “sales of Avon, Mary Kay cosmetics, 
Tupperware, and Pampered Chef products,” individual commercial solicitations included 
“sales of homemade foods, jewelry, and holiday crafts,” school fund-raising solicitations 
included “sales of candy, candles, and wrapping paper items,” and personal solicitations 
included “collections of money for various families.”  Id. 
278 Id. 
279 NLRB Charge Against Community Medical Centers, NLRB Case No. 32-CA-23591 
(Oct. 22, 2007) (on file with author) (filed by SEIU United Healthcare Workers-West). 
280 See GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4 (noting Register-Guard I is not a bar to 
issuing complaint regarding discriminatory enforcement of  “facially valid no-solicitation 
rule”). 
281 Id. at 5. 
282 This was a term used in the unfair labor practices charge filed.  It refers to reissuing 
or reannouncing a previously on-the-books policy against use of e-mail for any nonwork 
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was “an otherwise valid rule prohibiting non-business e-mail.”283  An 
employee who had asked the employer’s I.T. director for advice 
concerning “what was considered abuse of the employer’s computer 
system” was answered in a manner that did not caution the employee 
that his subsequent use of the system to send e-mails to twenty 
employees about an off-site union organizing meeting would be 
prohibited.284  That topic was not within the parameters that were 
discussed, but, after the employee sent the e-mails, he was warned in 
writing both that e-mail for solicitation purposes violated handbook 
provisions and that solicitation during working time for any purpose 
was prohibited.285  The warning also stated “that the employer’s e-
mail system is intended for reasonable and responsible business 
purposes and is not intended for personal use.”286 
The GC Memorandum noted that the employer’s decision to 
discipline was “content based” and there was evidence that it was 
intended to chill union activity.287  Other nonwork e-mails circulated 
during work time (including chain letters, jokes, party invitations, and 
non-business-related solicitations for cosmetics and candies), and the 
senders were not subjected to discipline.288  The employer eventually 
agreed to not discipline its employees because of union activity, not 
enforce a previously unenforced rule in response to union activity, 
and not prohibit employee e-mails or soliciting about unions during 
working time, while permitting other e-mails and solicitations about 
nonwork matters during working time.  Despite the settlement, the 
employer subsequently disciplined the same employee again for an e-
mail with union-related content.289  The General Counsel decided that 
a complaint should issue following the analysis of the Board majority 
in Register-Guard I that the “‘employer’s motive for the line-drawing 
was antiunion.’”290  The Salmon Run Shopping Center, LLC, case, 
which the Board majority cited with approval in Register-Guard I, 
 
purpose, a rule that had been ignored or unenforced for a period of time.  As is discussed 
below, the key to the sudden enforcement of the policy was the curtailing of employee 
union activity. 
283 See GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 5. 
284 Id. at 6. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 7. 
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also applied in Case 3 because the employer’s denial of union access 
“was based ‘solely on the union’s status as a labor organization and 
its desire to engage in labor-related speech.’”291 
The charge against Sutter Regional Medical Foundation alleged 
that an appointment-registration manager and the director of human 
resources both discriminated against an employee registration-
representative because of her union activities.292  The initial charge 
filed in August 2006 noted that the specific activities of the 
management team amounted to unfair labor practices under sections 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act because the activities involved 
discipline of the employee “by a written warning because of her union 
activities and [management] made changes in her condition of 
employment to discourage union activity.”293  An amended charge 
filed in October 2006 added allegations that broadened the focus to 
include more discriminatory enforcement of e-mail and no-
solicitation rules, specifically: 
Within the last six months, the employer unlawfully re-promulgated 
a pre-viosly [sic] unenforced rule that prohibited the use of email 
for any non-work [sic] purposes during work time. 
Within the last six months, the employer unlawfully enforced a rule 
barring solicitation during work hours by selectively and disparately 
enforcing the rule in regard to employee union activity. 
Within the last six months, the employer unlawfully enforced a rule 
prohibiting use of email for nonwork purposes during working time 
 
291 Id. (citing Salmon Run Shopping Ctr., LLC, 348 N.L.R.B. 658 (2006) (ordering a 
private shopping mall to allow nonemployee union organizers to distribute literature 
critical of a mall patron to other mall patrons because discriminatory exclusion of the 
union organizers violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act)).  The dissent in Register-Guard I 
distinguished Salmon Run from its case on the basis that Salmon Run involved 
nonemployee access and, thus, invoked the employer’s property interests rather than 
managerial interests.  Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1130 n.24 
(2007).  The dissent also objected that the majority inferred that anti-union motivation was 
required in order to find a violation only because there was anti-union motivation present 
in the Salmon Run case.  Id.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to 
enforce the Board’s order subsequent to the Register-Guard I decision. Salmon Run 
Shopping Ctr., LLC v. NLRB, 534 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2008). 
292 NLRB Charge Against Sutter Regional Medical Foundation, NLRB Case No. 20-
CA-33085 (Aug. 7, 2006) (on file with author) (filed by the Office & Professional 
Employees International Union, Local 29, AFL-CIO, CLC). 
293 Id. 
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by selectively and disparately enforcing the rule in regards to 
employee union activities.294 
The Board, through Members Liebman and Schaumber, denied 
Sutter Regional Medical Foundation’s motion for partial summary 
judgment concerning multiple complaint allegations against the 
employer on January 4, 2008.295  The September 28, 2007, complaint 
alleged that, in opposition to a union campaign, the employer: 
“unlawfully maintained and enforced an e-mail rule in response to 
[the] Union activity”; interrogated, threatened, and discriminated 
against employees because of their union activity; and “unlawfully 
enforced its solicitation and distribution rules in response to . . . 
Union activity.”296 
D.  Case 4 – Texas Dental Association 
The employer, Texas Dental Association, had a Board of Directors 
as an executive body, an executive director to manage the 
organization of medical directors, and a House of Delegates (House) 
for legislative matters.297  The employees expressed concern over 
working conditions, including disparate discipline, safety issues, and 
unfair implementation of paid time off.298  Management was 
nonresponsive to the employees’ issues concerning their wages, 
hours, working conditions, and the absence of a proper reporting 
procedure.299  An employee learned a House delegate was 
sympathetic to their concerns and sent e-mails to the entire House to 
engage support for an employee petition that sought an impartial, 
outside source to voice their grievances.300 
When the resolution for an employee complaint procedure was not 
adopted by the House, the employee e-mailed the petition to the 
 
294 NLRB Charge Against Sutter Regional Medical Foundation, NLRB Case No. 20-
CA-33085 (Oct. 31, 2006) (on file with author) (filed by the Office & Professional 
Employees International Union, Local 29, AFL-CIO, CLC). 
295 Board Denies Sutter Regional Medical Foundation’s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, NLRB REGION 20 ROUNDUP, (NLRB, S.F., Cal.), Winter 2008, at 3 
[hereinafter Board Denies Motion], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/regional 
_newsletters/Region20NewsletterWinter2008.pdf.  Chairman Liebman and Member 
Schaumber remain as the two current members of the Board.  National Labor Relations 
Board, supra note 2. 
296 Board Denies Motion, supra note 295, at 3. 
297 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7. 
298 Id. at 7–8. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. at 8. 
 2009] Employees On Guard 241 
Board of Directors.301  The Executive Director investigated the 
source of the e-mail and, with the approval of the Board of Directors, 
discharged the sender as well as a supervisor who had known of the e-
mail but failed to report it.302  The basis for the employee discharge 
was insubordination by “participating in the ‘anonymous e-mail 
scheme,’ ignoring instructions to come forward,” inappropriately 
using the employer’s computers in violation of policy, “and acting 
outside the scope of responsibilities.”303  The supervisor was 
discharged for insubordination and failure to disclose the information 
about the e-mail and the authors.304 
The actual charge filed against the Texas Dental Association by 
former employee Nathan Clark alleged that he and another employee 
were terminated 
for attempting to organize with other staff members to address 
grievances against management.  Employees, in an attempt to 
address grievances and report unfair labor practices by 
management, organized and created a petition and attempted to 
contact the Board of Directors and governing body of the 
corporation in order to have our grievances heard by an impartial 
third party.  Grievances included requesting employees to perform 
illegal acts, terminating employees for attempting to report illegal 
workplace activities, and attempts by management to financially 
defraud the organization’s membership by misrepresenting financial 
expenditures on financial reports, among other issues.  The 
Executive Director terminated [Nathan Clark’s] employment on 
August 17, 2006 [sic] for attempting to organize with other 
employees to file grievances to the Board of Directors and 
governing body of the Association.305 
In Texas Dental Ass’n, the General Counsel reported that the 
employer unlawfully discharged both the employee for engaging in 
protected activity and the supervisor for refusing to commit an unfair 
labor practice.306  The employer’s purported reason for the discharge 
was not supported by evidence, and it was improper for the employer 
to discipline an employee for failure to abide by a rule that prohibited 
section 7-protected activity.307  The employer allowed reasonable, 
 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 NLRB Charge Against Texas Dental Association, NLRB Case No. 16-CA-25349 
(Dec. 12, 2006) (on file with author) (filed by Nathan Clark). 
306 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
307 Id. at 9. 
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personal use of its computers, the Internet, and e-mail but then 
disparately enforced its e-mail policy against the protected concerted 
activity.308  Analyzing the facts in light of the Register-Guard I 
decision, with its adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s discrimination 
analysis, the General Counsel found the evidence indicated that “the 
employer had not drawn a meaningful distinction between employee 
e-mails that it permits (jokes, baby announcements, offers of sports 
tickets) and those that it prohibits (Section 7 content).”309  The 
discharged employee’s e-mails were not solicitations but “direct 
communications to management seeking improvement in working 
conditions.”310  Thus, the General Counsel found “that these e-mails 
were more job-related than the personal e-mails that the employer 
permitted,” making the discharge unlawful because it was based upon 
discriminatory enforcement of its electronic communications 
policy.311 
What is interesting in this analysis is that the General Counsel is 
purportedly using the Seventh Circuit’s analysis for discrimination 
from Register-Guard I but, at the same time, noting no “meaningful 
distinction” to justify the various types of e-mails that the employer 
permitted or prohibited.312  The employer’s e-mail policy was not 
broken into the same types of categories as the policy at issue in 
Register-Guard I, namely non-job-related communications and 
outside solicitation.  Those categories allowed the Register-Guard to 
withstand the majority’s scrutiny in Register-Guard I.  The General 
Counsel looked at the employer’s disciplinary responses to various 
employee e-mails and refused to immunize the employer’s after-the-
fact justifications for its disparate enforcement of its policy.  Case 4 
of the memorandum provides hope that Register-Guard I will not 
routinely get the employer off the hook, at least not unless the 
employer has set up “meaningful” distinctions for the categories of 
permitted and prohibited e-mail use.  The General Counsel’s 
assessment that the e-mails to management were more job-related 
than the personal e-mails that the employer permitted indicates that 
the General Counsel, like the dissent in Register-Guard I, is prepared 
to sift through pretentious categories that make no business sense—
 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 10. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 See id.  The majority in Register-Guard I did not require “meaningful distinctions” 
for categories of communications or activities. 
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categories that are a pretext for prohibiting employees from engaging 
in statutorily protected activity or disciplining them for the same. 
The administrative law judge’s subsequent decision, pursuant to a 
consolidated and amended complaint in Texas Dental Ass’n, found 
that the discharges were unlawful under the Act.313  The “official use 
only requirement” of the employer’s communications policy was not 
adhered to, and no discipline occurred prior to the discharge of Mr. 
Clark.314  Mr. Clark’s discharge resulted from his protected concerted 
activity, including his failure to report any involvement in the 
anonymous e-mails.315  Subsequent to the Board’s decision in 
Register-Guard I, the complaint in Texas Dental Ass’n was amended 
to delete a section 8(a)(1) allegation regarding the employer’s 
electronic communications policy but the complaint still alleged 
disparate enforcement of the policy.316  The administrative law judge 
found that the company’s discharge of Mr. Clark was disparate 
enforcement of that policy.317  The judge also found that supervisor 
Barbara Lockerman was discharged for “her failure to come forward 
with her knowledge [of] the petition, [a] protected concerted activity 
of the employees.”318  Ms. Lockerman was entitled to withhold the 
information she obtained by attending the employee meeting.319  Her 
discharge for refusing to engage in an unfair labor practice was itself 
an unfair labor practice under the Act.320  The administrative law 
judge ordered that both Mr. Clark and Ms. Lockerman be offered 
reinstatement plus back pay.321 
E.  Case 5 – Starbucks 
The final case in the General Counsel’s memorandum involved a 
change in company bulletin board policy as a direct reaction to union 
 
313 Texas Dental Assoc., Case No. S 16-CA-25349, 2008 WL 1732928, at *1 (NLRB 
Div. of Judges Apr. 10, 2008).  Nathan Clark and Patricia St. Germain were the 
employees, and Barbara J. Lockerman was the supervisor. 
314 Id. at *6. 
315 Id. at *8. 
316 Id. at *10. 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at *11. 
320 Id. at *12. 
321 Id. at *14. 
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activity at a Starbucks Corporation store in New York.322  The 
memorandum noted that the facts were “clearly distinguishable from 
those in Register Guard [I].”323  The employer had two bulletin 
boards that were used, one for company announcements and one for 
employees, prior to the onset of organizational activity at the 
facility.324  The employee bulletin board was used for all types of 
personal and non-work-related matters, including an anti-war protest 
march and party announcements.325  There was no written policy 
regarding the use of the boards.326 
The day after a union organizer gave a list of demands on behalf of 
the union to the company, the employer removed union documents 
from the employee bulletin board and, then, removed all employee 
materials and posted employer materials thereon.327  The union 
organizer asked the employer about this and was told that employees 
were no longer allowed to post anything.328  Unlike in the Register-
Guard I case, the General Counsel noted that in Case 5 of the 
memorandum there was no disparate enforcement of what was a 
facially neutral, written company-wide policy.329  Rather, at 
Starbucks, an unwritten policy was changed in reaction to union 
activity, evidencing an anti-union motive, and the previously issued 
complaint would, even after the Register-Guard I decision, continue 
to allege discriminatory prohibition of employee use of the bulletin 
board.330  The resolution of the unfair labor practice complaint in 
 
322 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10; see NLRB Charge Against Starbucks 
Corporation, NLRB Case No. 2-CA-37548 (Mar. 14, 2006) (on file with author) (filed by 
Industrial Union 660) (identifying respondent employer). 
323 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10. 
324 Id. at 11. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. at 10–11.  An administrative law judge has since issued a decision on the 
consolidated Starbucks unfair labor practice charges represented in Case 5 of the GC 
Memorandum (2-CA-37548).  The ALJ found that the timing of the employer changes—
such as restricting posting of union material on the bulletin board, wearing of union 
buttons, and talking about unions and working conditions, as well as the discipline and 
discharge of employees for engaging in protected activity—were in reaction to union 
organization and, thus, violated the Act.  Of particular note was the selection of actions 
that were limited or prohibited, which indicated inconsistent enforcement of rules to limit 
union-related conduct.  See Lawrence E. Dube, Unfair Labor Practices: ALJ Finds 
Starbucks Violated NLRA Rights, Citing Interference, Discipline at NYC Stores, Daily 
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 249, at A-1 (Dec. 30, 2008); see also Starbucks Corp., Case No. 2-
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Starbucks Corp. reflects that the Register-Guard I decision, as 
interpreted by the General Counsel who advises the Board’s regional 
offices, will not provide a carte blanche for employers to prohibit 
section 7-protected activity, even where use of company equipment 
such as bulletin boards is at issue, if the timing of changes in rules or 
the selective enforcement of rules indicates anti-union motivation. 
F.  Summary 
In conclusion, the report of post-Register-Guard I cases handled by 
the Division of Advice indicated that, where an employer permits 
employees to use the employer’s e-mail system, employers may place 
reasonable limits on that use.331  The General Counsel noted that 
employer distinctions should be meaningful, stopping short of saying 
that there should be a legitimate business reason for the distinctions.  
But the General Counsel nonetheless analyzed the categories and the 
rationale for the categories more closely than the majority of the 
Board did in Register-Guard I.332  One can read between the lines of 
the General Counsel’s memorandum that categories that make no 
sense or are unrelated to a business reason will be scrutinized closely 
and may be an indicia of illegal motivation—especially where there 
appears to be no advantage for the employer other than screening out 
union or concerted activity.  Where otherwise valid rules are 
promulgated for anti-union reasons, these remain unlawful after the 
Register-Guard I decision.333  The timing of employer changes in its 
communications policy, e.g., in reaction to the onset of union or other 
concerted activity, would certainly raise a red flag regarding motive 
in light of the General Counsel’s memorandum.  Direct 
communication with management about working conditions remains 
a protected activity even when an employee uses the employer’s e-
mail.334  Also, the General Counsel’s memorandum noted that the 
 
CA-37548, 2008 WL 5351366, at *17–19 (NLRB Div. of Judges Dec. 19, 2008) 
(discussing the timing of restrictions as evidence of anti-union motivation and the 
application of the discriminatory enforcement standard from Register-Guard I). 
331 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12. 
332 See supra notes 309–11 and accompanying text (discussing the language of the 
General Counsel in the GC Memorandum regarding Case 4). 
333 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12. 
334 See id.; see also Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249–50 (1997) (holding 
that employee e-mail communication with management regarding the employer’s 
changing vacation day plan was a protected concerted activity). 
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General Counsel will continue to require cases involving Register-
Guard I-type issues to be brought to the Division of Advice.335 
The impact of the Board’s decision in Register-Guard I will 
continue to be more restrictive upon employees and unions, unless 
either the Board changes its tack on workplace communications 
policies in the future or the appellate courts refuse to enforce the 
Board’s current framework for deciding both what is a discriminatory 
communications policy and what is discriminatory enforcement.  
Because the legality of the Register-Guard’s CSP is not before the 
Board upon remand, that issue will await further clarification in a 
future case.  Meanwhile, the General Counsel seems to be narrowly 
following the majority’s rule in Register-Guard I, while still striving 
to maintain the protection afforded by the Act.  Regional directors 
will follow the example and advice provided by the General Counsel. 
Administrative law judges will also be grappling with the new 
Register-Guard I framework.  In one recent decision, Stephens Media, 
LLC,336 an administrative law judge noted that the Register-Guard I 
decision “reversed a long line of Board cases dealing with 
discriminatory enforcement of work rules.”337  After Register-Guard 
I, he said “it would no longer be sufficient to show that an employer 
merely disparately enforced its rules but it must be shown that, ‘. . . 
unlawful discrimination consists of disparate treatment of activities or 
communications of a similar character because of their union or other 
Section 7-protected status.’”338  Even under this more demanding and 
restrictive analysis, however, the judge concluded that the respondent 
in the case discriminatorily enforced its security policy against the 
union.339  This was discrimination because there was no security 
policy requiring prior management approval for access of outside 
organizations, and, thus, the employer’s enforcement of this alleged 
policy only against the union was discrimination.340  The 
administrative law judge stated that “[e]ven the Seventh Circuit . . . 
 
335 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 12.  This is to “assure a consistent approach to 
our casehandling.”  Id.  The General Counsel clearly wishes to maintain a close watch on 
cases governed by the Board’s Register-Guard I decision. 
336 Case No. S 37-CA-7043, 2008 WL 649133 (NLRB Div. of Judges Mar. 6, 2008). 
337 Id. at *16. 
338 Id. (quoting Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1119 (2007)). 
339 Id. at *17. 
340 Id. 
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[would recognize that allowing] notices for anything except unions     
. . . ‘is anti-union discrimination by anyone’s definition.’”341 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
After the National Labor Relations Board’s decision in Register-
Guard I, employers have greater rights to restrict nonwork use of e-
mail than in the past.  However, whether the Register-Guard I 
rationale will withstand the test of time, appeal, and Board member 
turnover is another matter.  The Board majority in Register-Guard I 
excused employer restriction of e-mail because there were “alternate 
means” of communication among employees.  The Board majority 
maintained that employers may restrict employees from use of e-mail 
even where this would restrict section 7-protected communications, 
essentially applying a nonemployee standard for real property access.  
This is not a satisfactory balancing of interests in the context of the 
modern-day workplace and current labor law precedent, which 
permits employee solicitation and distribution on nonwork time and 
in nonwork areas.  Whether cyberspace is a “work area” is another 
question, and, in a sense, it is the wrong question because the 
traditional notion of work area is no longer relevant in most modern-
day workplaces.342 
Similarly, the traditional labor law distinctions regarding 
solicitation and distribution are not readily applicable to Internet 
communications, and this outmoded analysis should be abandoned 
when the Board fashions new rules for workplace e-mail 
communications.343  The dissent in Register-Guard I criticized the 
majority’s decision, noting it “confirms that the NLRB has become 
 
341 Id. (quoting Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1995)).  
This was the same rationale that the D.C. Circuit referenced in the Register-Guard I 
appeal.  See infra notes 358–59 and accompanying text (discussing that singling out of 
union activity for discipline is discrimination) (citing St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs. 
v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 373, 375–76 (7th Cir. 2008)). 
342 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 262, 286–87 (2008) (arguing that the manufacturing model of separate 
work area and break area is no longer the dominant model and the Board’s attempt to 
follow the same rules, in modern workplaces, is not meaningful or workable and will 
impede employee exercise of statutory rights). 
343 See id. at 289–92 (assessing the solicitation and distribution dichotomy and 
recommending the Board use a new method of analysis for Internet communications). 
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the ‘Rip Van Winkle of administrative agencies.’”344  It is at least 
partly true that “United States labor and employment law sleep-
walked into cyberspace.”345  Most of its critics would agree that it is 
time for the Board to wake up to the reality of modern workplace 
communications. 
While employers certainly may be considered to “own” the e-mail 
addresses for the workplace accounts of their employees, the 
ownership or property questions are not always clear-cut, or even 
clearly relevant to labor law concerns.  An employer’s 
communications system may either store the information sent and 
received on its bandwidth or have an external company provide space 
on a server.  In either event, the employer incurs expense to run the 
system and has legal reasons to monitor its use, e.g., to ensure that 
employees are productive, not engaging in illegal harassment, etc.  
Some employees may be able to retrieve work e-mail messages only 
at work.  Other employees may be able to access their workplace e-
mail from their own hardware, whether at home or via mobile 
devices.  Employees may have personal e-mail accounts from their 
residential internet service providers or from free websites, e.g., 
Comcast, Verizon, RCN, Yahoo, America Online, Hotmail, and 
Gmail. Employees with multiple e-mail accounts are often able to 
channel the messages from one account into another, thus enabling 
them to merge their work and personal communications into their 
personal e-mail account. 
Should it make a difference in terms of labor law outcomes that an 
e-mail message is read on or sent from an employer- or employee-
owned computer?346  Should it make a difference in labor law 
outcomes that e-mail messages are stored on the company’s server or 
other outside servers?  Is the burden of transfer and storage of 
messages on the employer’s system a key “property” issue, or is it 
merely a managerial issue?  As the Eugene Newspaper Guild noted in 
its Brief on Appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a 
computer programmer who worked at the Register-Guard testified 
 
344 Guard Publ’g Co. (Register-Guard I), 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1121 (2007) (Liebman 
and Walsh, Members, dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Thill, Inc., 980 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th 
Cir. 1992)). 
345 William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must 
Be Honest, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 49, 55 (2008). 
346 It should be noted that it did not get union president Suzy Prozanski off the 
disciplinary hook in Register-Guard I when she sent a message from the union computer 
because she sent her message to employees at their workplace e-mail addresses. 
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that simple text messages sent on the newspaper’s e-mail system 
“place virtually no burden on the e-mail system,” especially when 
compared to the consumption of computer memory from nonbusiness 
photographs that the company allows on the system.347  The NLRB 
needs to come to grips with the impact of new technology that has, to 
a large extent, replaced face-to-face communication in most 
workplaces.  The Board must adapt the aging Act to the cyber 
environment and create rules that will address how new forms of 
communication in the virtual workplace fit with precedent based upon 
face-to-face communication. 
A disparate impact analysis should apply when an employer sets up 
categories that look facially neutral but the effect of which is to 
eliminate or discriminate against conduct protected by section 7 of the 
Act.  Communications systems policies that are overbroad in terms of 
restricting and interfering with section 7 rights should not withstand 
scrutiny on the basis that they are not intended to discriminate.  The 
interference with affirmative statutory rights in this context must be 
justified by a legitimate business reason. 
The Board should provide employers and unions more guidance in 
this area by outlining the appropriate characterizations of similar 
activities in a forward-looking advice memorandum.  The General 
Counsel’s memorandum on cases since Register-Guard I is a good 
beginning but falls short of prospective advice on creating appropriate 
categories that are legally relevant, which would allow employers to 
fashion lawful workplace communications policies.  Employees 
should be legally entitled to make use of employer e-mail systems for 
section 7 purposes on a nondiscriminatory basis subject to a balancing 
test that takes into account the employer’s legitimate business reasons 
for any restrictions.  Any company communications systems policy 
that outlines permissible and prohibited employee uses of the systems 
should not include broad prohibitions that exclude section 7 activities 
while allowing other non-business-related uses, unless the employer 
can support the exclusion of section 7 activities with a legitimate 
business reason.  Without this standard, employers will be free to 
sweep away employees’ section 7 rights with wholesale exclusions of 
categories of communications without a bona fide justification. 
 
347 Brief for Petitioner Eugene Newspaper Guild, supra note 258, at 5–6.  The 
programmer noted that the newspaper’s e-mail system handled three to four thousand 
pieces of e-mail with no difficulty.  Id. at 5. 
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Finally, as the General Counsel inferred in his memorandum with 
respect to Texas Dental Ass’n,348 it seems that the issue of union 
representation and working conditions is job-related—whether 
employees are considering choosing unionization, are in the process 
of bargaining for a collective bargaining agreement, or are deciding 
whether to engage in a lawful strike.  The union at the Register-Guard 
was comprised of employees, not outsiders, and e-mail 
communications about wages, hours and working conditions, and 
other matters of mutual aid or protection clearly relate to section 7 
rights, which are protected under the Act.  Even in the absence of a 
union, employees have protection to voice their opinions about such 
matters. 
The National Labor Relations Board’s decision in Register-Guard I 
should not remain the rule on employee use of employer e-mail 
systems.  Section 7 activities are entitled to affirmative protection 
under the National Labor Relations Act, and concerted activities, as 
well as other union organizational activities, should not be banned 
while employers allow other organizational and non-work-related use 
of the e-mail systems without legitimate business reasons for such 
distinctions.  Whether e-mail is characterized as solicitation, 
distribution, or both, the standard for employee use of workplace e-
mail should allow employees to engage in section 7 activity on e-mail 
during nonwork time unless the employer both asserts a legitimate 
business reason for excluding the use and also does not discriminate 
against section 7 activity via the use of e-mail for other non-work-
related uses of a similar character. 
ADDENDUM 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently issued its 
decision in Guard Publishing Co. v. NLRB (Register-Guard II).349  In 
what was a victory for the union, the appellate court upheld as 
“certainly reasonable” the Board’s conclusion that the employer’s 
discipline of  Ms. Prozanski for her first, May 4th, e-mail was 
discrimination along section 7 lines and, thus, a violation of section 
8(a)(1) of the Act.350  The warning was discriminatory because that 
 
348 GC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10 (noting e-mails regarding working 
conditions to management were more job-related than personal e-mails that the employer 
permitted). 
349 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
350 Id. at 59. 
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specific e-mail involved mere factual correction about the rally and 
was not a solicitation that was prohibited by the Register-Guard’s 
Communications Systems Policy. 
The court found that there was not substantial evidence to support 
the Board’s conclusion that the Register-Guard lawfully disciplined 
Ms. Prozanski for her other two August e-mails.351  While the latter 
e-mails were solicitations, the court noted that the employer’s line 
barring access based upon organization status was merely a “post hoc 
invention,” one that the company did not invoke until after the 
NLRB’s General Counsel filed a complaint.352  The company policy 
made no distinction based upon solicitation by groups or individuals, 
rather it forbid all non-job-related solicitations.353  Additionally, the 
company’s disciplinary warning about Ms. Prozanski’s August e-
mails did not raise “the organization-versus-individual line.”354  
Rather, the warning asked her to refrain from using the company’s 
systems for “union/personal business.”355  Similarly, the disciplinary 
notice regarding her May e-mail did not draw a line based upon the 
organizational issue; instead, it said that it was not permissible to use 
the company e-mail for purposes other than company business.356  
The court noted that “neither the company’s written policy nor its 
express enforcement rationales relied on an organizational 
justification.”357  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found it 
telling that the only e-mails that resulted in discipline at the Register-
Guard were union-related ones.358  They referenced the Seventh 
Circuit’s recent decision in St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers v. 
NLRB for the proposition that singling out both union activity and a 
union supporter for rebuke amounts to discrimination against union 
activity.359 
 
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 60. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. 
355 Id. (emphasis in original). 
356 Id. at 59. 
357 Id. at 60. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at 60–61 (citing St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs. v. NLRB, 519 F.3d 373, 
375–76 (7th Cir. 2008)); see supra notes 212–31 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Centers v. 
NLRB to both the Board majority’s rationale in Register Guard I and the likely outcome of 
the Register-Guard I appeal). 
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Although the union believed that the company’s no-solicitation 
policy was overly broad, it did not seek review of the Board’s finding 
that the Register-Guard’s no-solicitation policy was lawful, and, thus, 
the appellate court did not consider this larger issue, instead limiting 
its consideration to the discriminatory enforcement of the company’s 
policy.360  AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel James B. Coppess 
discussed the reason the union did not appeal the Board’s ruling on 
the policy itself.361  In the union’s view, while the Board’s decision 
on the validity of the company’s policy was wrong, the union deemed 
that decision to be a policy choice within the Board’s discretion that 
the appellate court was unlikely to overturn.362  Mr. Coppess 
speculated  that the Board may reach a different decision on the 
validity of such policies in a future case.363  In the interim, challenges 
to company policies that restrict section 7 activity will likely focus on 
discriminatory enforcement rather than the overbreadth of the 
policies. 
As the Board considers the Register-Guard II case upon remand, 
its review will be limited to consideration of evidence related to the 
unfair labor practice charges concerning the Register-Guard’s 
discriminatory enforcement of the Communications Systems Policy 
against the union president for her two later e-mails.  These e-mails 
constituted solicitations and, thus, fell within the prohibitions of the 
company’s CSP.  However, the appellate court found that there was 
not substantial evidence on the record to support the Board’s finding 
that the employer’s discipline of Ms. Prozanski was lawful because 
the employer’s drawing of the line barring access to the e-mail 
system, based upon organizational status, was a line not enforced until 
after the fact.  In reality, the employer warned her against use of the 
communications system for union or personal use and for purposes 
other than company business rather than warning her based upon any 
organizational status.  Even more telling, the only e-mails that the 
employee was disciplined for were union-related, which the appellate 
court viewed as evidence of discrimination. 
Upon remand, the Board should restate its standard for 
discriminatory enforcement of a valid employer rule, specifically 
 
360 Id. at 58. 
361 See Susan J. McGolrick, Unfair Labor Practices: D.C. Circuit Rules Guard 
Publishing Illegally Disciplined Copy Editor for E-mails, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 
128, at AA-1 (July 8, 2009). 
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
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avoiding the “discrimination along section 7 lines” analysis that has 
proven inadequate to protect section 7 rights.  The Board should 
preface the discriminatory enforcement standard with a statement 
that, where an employer rule interferes with section 7 rights, the rule 
should be able to withstand a balancing test showing that the 
interference is necessary because of the employer’s legitimate 
business reasons.  The Board should clarify that an employer’s 
pretextual reasons will not carry the day when important statutory 
rights are unduly restricted.  Finally, where valid employer rules 
relate to solicitation and distribution, the Board should reaffirm its 
traditional rule that employees are free to solicit and distribute on 
nonwork time and distribute in nonwork areas.  The Board could 
declare that they will characterize workplace e-mails as solicitation, 
distribution, or both based upon the content of the messages.  This is 
both a traditional analysis for protection of section 7 rights and 
certainly preferable to the property-based analysis used by the 
Register-Guard I majority, which unduly elevated an employer’s 
ownership of equipment over these important statutory rights. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did not address the larger 
question in Register-Guard I, namely whether the employer’s 
Communications Systems Policy itself was a violation of section 
8(a)(1).  That question must now await the Board’s consideration in a 
future case. 
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